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Innovations through research and development (R&D) driving technological change are 
considered the key determinants of the long-standing competitiveness and economic welfare 
of national economies.1 Fostering innovation is thus broadly acknowledged as a core 
requirement of successful economic policy. Naturally, technological and institutional 
innovations are not considered as a means in itself; rather, the specific aims connected to 
innovation policy are determined in the political process and might be economic growth, high 
levels of employment, international competitiveness or goals related to environmental, social, 
public health or defense objectives. Therefore, each nation follows distinct patterns of 
innovation policy, which are shaped in the respective national policy discourses. Innovation 
policy thus builds upon historically established institutional patterns and traditions but 
similarly integrates the results acknowledged in the field of innovation research (Audretsch 
2002; Fagerberg et al. 2010; Borrás and Edquist 2013). 
Following this focus on innovativeness in the political discussion, economic research has 
contributed theoretical and empirical evidence for decades in terms of determining how to 
foster economies’ innovativeness. Therefore, it analyzes the effects of incentives for creativity 
and innovation and the distribution of knowledge, as well as the socio-economic framework 
conditions such as institutions, law and policy processes. Among this, researchers discuss the 
impact of legal regulations on entrepreneurial decisions, which includes the use of specific 
policy instruments and their effective combination (Flanagan et al. 2011; Guerzoni and Raiteri 
2015). 
This dissertation contributes to this field by investigating the effects of regulatory and 
financial policy instruments on individuals’ propensity to engage in innovative activities and 
the extent to which specific instruments can enhance the welfare created through fostering 
innovation. Thus, it addresses the questions which policy instruments should be employed and 
how to best shape the respective institutional frameworks to achieve an optimal development 
of innovative activity. In particular, it explores the extent to which specific policy instruments 
can positively influence the individual innovation activity and whether specific institutional 
factors affect an individual’s innovation output as well as their cooperation behavior. Both 
aspects are among the central factors determining the overall success of long-term innovation 
policies, whereby the innovation output can be considered the core parameter to determine the 
overall welfare effect of a specific instrument (Grossman and Helpman 1990; Verspagen 
2005). Similarly, innovators’ willingness to engage in cooperation is considered an essential 
                                                 
1 In a broad sense, innovation is defined as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product 
(good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method inbusiness [sic] 
practices, workplace organization or external relations” OECD (2005, 46). 
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feature of all successful and sustained innovative processes which involve the sharing, 
dissemination and further development of knowledge (Lundvall and Borrás 2005; Faria et al. 
2010). If one of these two parameters were to decrease due to the introduction of a specific 
policy instrument, its further implementation should be questioned. 
While a large number of theoretical and empirical methods have been developed and 
significantly improved to assess the effectiveness of specific policy tools, ambiguity remains 
in innovation research regarding the optimal use and combination of policy instruments. 
Overall, the established methods in theoretical and empirical innovation research continue to 
yield mixed evidence; further, there is a lack of data providing clear counterfactual evidence 
on the effects of introducing or altering specific instruments (Cohen 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et 
al. 2014). The methodology of laboratory experiments is employed in this dissertation due to 
its distinct advantage of being able to provide this particular kind of empirical evidence, i.e. 
for counterfactual situations. Specifically, three examples from the field of innovation 
research are analyzed in chapters two to four using laboratory experiments to provide 
evidence on the effects of specific policy instruments in the three domains of intellectual 
property rights, innovation contests and subsidies. In all three cases, the experimental method 
is a fruitful addition to the existing studies, as a situation without the specific instrument can 
be compared to a counterfactual setting implementing the instrument in question. 
While the approach of using experiments in innovation research has already yielded 
interesting insights, there is valid criticism concerning its application. Specifically, it is argued 
that transferring innovation processes in the laboratory entails a trade-off between simulating 
a complex process precisely and maintaining the game’s feasibility for the participants of the 
experiment (Levitt and List 2007). Acknowledging the methodological discussion on the 
appropriate application of laboratory evidence, this dissertation considers the advantages and 
limitations of the experimental approach in simulating innovation activities in its final chapter 
five. Furthermore, the final chapter highlights the contributions of laboratory experiments to 
innovation research to date and derives suggestions for future lines of research. 
Before summarizing the different chapters of this dissertation, the introduction provides 
insights into the theoretical background of public innovation support and the policy 
instruments that have been developed and used to foster innovation. Since the core chapters of 
this dissertation pursue an experimental approach, it is refrained from explicating the general 
understanding of innovation policy in each chapter. Thus, the basic understanding and 
definitions of innovation policy and its implications underlying this dissertation are described 
in the following. 
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1.1. Theoretical justification of innovation policy 
From a micro level perspective, firms by definition aim to increase profits and protect or 
enhance their position on the market by initiating innovative activities to develop new 
products or processes. Baumol summarizes this need strikingly by stating: “Under capitalism, 
innovative activity [...] becomes mandatory, a life-and-death matter for the firm” (Baumol 
2002, 1), which is indicated for example in the study by Banbury and Mitchell (1995) by 
showing a positive relationship between a firm’s long-term success and their innovation rate 
(Hong et al. 2012). Consequently, firms are assumed to have an intrinsic motivation to further 
drive innovations. 
By contrast, from the government’s perspective, the goal of innovation policy – which in a 
wider understanding also includes technology and industrial policy – is to change the 
outcomes of ordinary market competition, to improve social welfare and to influence the rate 
and direction of technological change. In a broader sense, innovation policy also includes the 
intervention for the development of sectors with high prospects of economic growth (Pack 
and Saggi 2006). 
The rationale behind supporting publicly innovation activity is the existence of market 
failures, as initially suggested by Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) for the case of 
underinvestment and underproduction in scientific research. Arrow argues that knowledge can 
be considered an important production factor that generates positive spill-overs as it can be 
adopted and used easily from other private actors; nonetheless, from the originator’s 
perspective, the private rate of return from knowledge is lower than its social return. This gap 
between the private rate of return and the cost of producing knowledge leads to an 
underinvestment in R&D as the market does not provide adequate incentives to invest in 
research. Therefore, knowledge is a public good as it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and 
thus leads to free-riding on the innovators’ investments. The difference between the 
innovators’ costs – which includes the investment risks – and the socially desirable production 
of knowledge can be understood as the opportunity costs of relying on the market 
mechanisms. These opportunity costs need to be weighed against the costs of government 
intervention which aim at increasing the production of knowledge. This line of reasoning can 
partly be transferred to technological knowledge, which can be distinguished from scientific 
knowledge by the institution responsible for its generation. The latter produces knowledge 
under open disclosure with the innovators’ aim of receiving recognition by the scientific 
community, while innovators of technological knowledge aim to acquire exclusive rights for 
the commercial exploitation of the innovation in the form of intellectual property rights or the 
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possibility of secrecy. Therefore, up to a certain degree, the argumentation of scientific 
knowledge also comprehends technological knowledge. Nonetheless, technological 
knowledge can only partly be characterized as a public good, since the system of intellectual 
property rights enables the exclusion of others (Audretsch 2002; Hall 2002; Steinmueller 
2010). 
The existence of market failures such as knowledge externalities or financial market 
imperfections due to information asymmetries are often necessary yet not sufficient 
conditions to justify state intervention. Optimally, before governments decide to intervene, the 
costs and benefits of the intervention are taken into account and it is only decided in favor of 
an intervention when the benefits are very likely to outperform the costs (Audretsch 2002). 
Obviously, this fundamental reasoning of market failure in favor of innovation policy has 
been expanded during recent decades in numerous different ways such as Schumpeterian 
growth theory, Neo-Marshallian, systemic institutional and evolutionary approaches. These 
theories have added several potential rationales for government interventions such as system 
and institutional failures, support to the accumulation of endogenous R&D and learning 
failures (Laranja et al. 2008). Nevertheless, Arrow’s approach of market failure in knowledge 
production can be considered a theoretical basis for the development of governmental 
interventions in the field of innovation. On this basis, a broad set of policy instruments has 
been developed, which are explained in the following. 
1.2. Innovation policy instruments and their application 
Public policy instruments can be defined as a collection of methods to foster economic change 
by stimulating innovation (Vedung 1998, 21). To classify the choice and design of different 
policy instruments, they can be divided into three categories: (1) regulatory instruments, (2) 
economic and financial instruments and (3) soft instruments, whereby the combination of the 
three instruments has been referred to as ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’.2 In the following, these 
central instruments outlined by Vedung (1998) and Borrás and Edquist (2013, 1515–18) are 
briefly explained to provide the context in which the experiments in this dissertation have 
been conducted. 
(1) Legal tools constitute the first category, in which the institutional frameworks for the 
interactions between economic actors are defined through the normative authority of 
governments. Therefore, regulatory instruments are used to determine the overarching market 
                                                 
2 There are other classifications of policy instruments, as discussed for instance by Steinmueller (2010); 
however, the classification used in this dissertation is broadly accepted in both the scientific literature and 
practical contexts, see Borrás and Edquist (2013) and Vedung (1998).  
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conditions in which innovative activity takes place. An important characteristic of regulatory 
instruments is their mandatory nature and the implied sanctioning of violators. Depending on 
the legal tool – for example, laws, rules or directives – the sanction can differ between fines, 
other economic penalties or a temporary retraction of specific rights. Furthermore, this 
category comprises instruments such as intellectual property rights as part of patent law, the 
regulation of research and higher education, competition law with a focus on R&D, ethical 
regulations as well as regulations of the industrial sector affecting innovative activities. 
Beside these immediate influences of regulatory instruments, they also can function indirectly 
– for example, by prohibiting a specific chemical process – which subsequently forces the 
respective firms to develop alternative processes or products to remain in the market. 
(2) Economic and financial instruments support innovators with specific monetary and 
non-monetary incentives or disincentives, which makes innovating more attractive in terms of 
money, time and effort. In contrast to regulatory instruments, these instruments are not 
compulsory, which means that they neither impose nor prohibit a specific action. Therefore, 
innovators can decide for themselves whether to take the respective action or not. Incentives 
used to encourage and promote innovative activities include cash transfers and grants, 
subsidies, reduced interest loans, loan guarantees and competitive research funding for 
applied industrial as well as basic research. Among the disincentives available to regulators 
are taxes, charges, fees, customs duties and tariffs on particular goods and services. Moreover, 
financial instruments might foster technology transfer or incentivize the investment of venture 
and seed capital. Beside this direct support for private actors, a substantial part of public 
economic support is often invested directly in state-owned universities and public research 
organizations. Consequently, research infrastructures can be considered as an indirect 
financial instrument to support innovative activity. 
(3) Soft instruments can be understood as a form of moral suasion by the state. They are 
based on the transfer of knowledge, the communication of information, persuasive reasoning 
and a resulting voluntary adherence of the economic actors. Soft instruments can provide 
advice, normative requests or ask for voluntary approval to specific policy measures, whereby 
examples include promoting scientific knowledge on ‘research days’, publicly accessible 
documentations, codes of conduct for firms and public research organizations, voluntary 
technical standards or stipulations. Institutional means to implement soft instruments can 
include technology transfer offices or cooperation in public-private partnerships sharing costs, 
benefits and risks for knowledge infrastructure. By using these instruments, the function of 
the government changes “from being a provider and regulator to being a coordinator and 
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facilitator” (Borrás and Edquist 2013, 1516). The application of soft instruments – and thus a 
different understanding of the state’s role – has developed during the past two decades. 
When considering the application of these three instruments, it can be stated that the 
current strong role of these instruments and the prevalence of innovation and industrial policy 
have increased in recent years. Since the 1980s, the field of industrial policy – and thus 
innovation policy – had been disregarded for two distinct reasons. First, there were concerns 
that direct innovation policy would necessarily induce government failures due to a lack of 
information on the part of the government. This was assumed to lead governments to take 
counterproductive regulatory choices. Second, concerns about the effects of lobbying were 
weighed more heavily. It was assumed that strong government interventions in industrial 
policy would lead to rent-seeking behavior by firms and thus induce corruption, which would 
ultimately hamper innovation and economic growth. Therefore, it was implied that industrial 
policy would allocate resources worse than the market; nevertheless, instruments such as 
grants and tax exemptions were still used broadly (Landesmann 2015). 
However, it is argued that there has been a revival of industrial policy in Europe following 
the international financial and economic crisis of 2008, partly due to the need to restore 
growth after the crisis itself and partly due to the increasing pressure of being competitive on 
globalized markets (Landesmann 2015). For example, the German federal government has 
pledged to establish a high-tech strategy, building upon the European Commission’s Horizon 
2020 strategy declared in 2010, within which the European Commission determined the aim 
that each member state should spent three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) for 
research and development (COM (2010) 2020; BMBF 2014). Germany only narrowly failed 
to reach this goal in 2013, for which the most current set of data is available: the share of 
internal expenditures for R&D was 2.85 percent of the GDP in 2013, which corresponds to 
about 80 billion Euros (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 11). 
Traditionally, innovation policy in Germany is based on project funding and thus it 
primarily uses economic and financial instruments. They can be distinguished into specific 
programs such as fostering Nano-technology and programs promoting innovative activities 
more broadly with a less specified range. These broader programs can include almost every 
kind of economic instrument, with the exception of tax credits, which are not practiced in 
Germany. Building on this institutional tradition, of the 80 billion Euros, about 67 percent 
were given to the private sector, 18 percent to universities and about 15 percent was invested 
in state-owned or non-profit organizations (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 10). For firms 
involved in innovative processes, the relevance of public financing has grown substantially: 
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before the crisis, subsidies were the fifth most important source of R&D funding for German 
firms and were used by only eight percent of the firms between 2004 and 2006. After the 
crisis, public support has increased to become the second important source of funding for 
2011 to 2013, being used by 21 percent of German firms (Rammer and Peters 2015, 32). 
This brief overview of innovation policy, its instruments and application underlines the 
increased priority of governmental action in fostering innovative activity. This implicates the 
purpose for innovation research to analyze the different instruments in detail. As outlined 
before, laboratory experiments can add to the existing literature of analyzing innovation 
policy instruments building on their ability to create counterfactual situations in which 
innovators’ reactions with and without the policy instrument are tested. Therefore, this 
dissertation presents three laboratory experiments, in which one regulatory and two economic 
instruments are investigated. Furthermore, the final chapter discusses the approach of using 
laboratory experiments in innovation research. Before presenting the four studies in chapters 
two to four, they are summarized in the following. 
1.3. Summary of chapters two to five 
The second chapter – named “Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation. 
Experimental evidence” – deals with the regulatory instrument of intellectual property rights 
and their effects on individual innovativeness and welfare. The aim of this chapter is to add 
insights to the discussion concerning the feasibility of intellectual property rights. Therefore, 
evidence from a counterfactual situation in an economic experiment is used, enabling the 
comparison of innovative settings with and without intellectual property rights. In the 
experiment, a sequential innovation process is simulated by building upon a creativity task 
introduced by Crosetto (2010), which transfers the board game Scrabble into an economic 
experiment. Within the experiment, subjects are rewarded for creating words and extending 
existing words with letters, which are bought from the experimenter. In the baseline 
treatment, all innovations can be used for free by all subjects. In a treatment implementing 
intellectual property rights, subjects are allowed to license their innovations for the use of 
others. In a further treatment, communication is introduced with a chat window to analyze 
cooperation effects during the innovative process. Therefore, a 2x2 between subjects design is 
implemented to check the effects of intellectual property (IP) rights and communication in 
comparison to a non-IP rights setting without inter-subject communication. 
The results show that welfare – as measured by the number and complexity of innovations 
created – decreases by 20-30 percent when license fees on innovations can be set. This 
follows from individual behavior in the intellectual property treatments, where subjects tend 
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to use their own innovations more often to avoid paying license fees to others. Moreover, 
there is a shift from more sophisticated and more valuable innovations to less valuable, 
simpler innovations, which further reduces overall welfare. Regarding the effects of 
communication among participants in this setting, previous findings in repeated public good 
games lead to the expectation that altruistic, cooperative behavior would increase 
(Fischbacher and Gächter 2010), thus translating into lower license fees in this experimental 
setting. However, communication does not have a positive influence on welfare in both 
respective treatments. Moreover, similar to the behavioral patterns observed in public good 
games, there is a strong path dependency of the level of license fees within a group, which is 
determined by the level of license fees chosen in the first periods. Furthermore, the level of 
license fees increases during the course of the game, which corresponds to a decrease in 
cooperation, comparable to declining contributions in public good games. The chapter 
concludes with the policy implication that IP rights might slow down – rather than fostering – 
the rate of innovation and the resulting welfare in domains of strictly sequential innovation 
such as software or bioengineering. 
The third chapter – entitled “Experimental evidence on the effects of innovation contests” – 
investigates innovation contests as a financial instrument for fostering innovation which is 
easily available to policy makers. This chapter adds to the discussion in economics and 
innovation management dealing with the impact and optimal design of innovation contests. 
Similar to chapter two, the Scrabble-like word creation task is used to simulate the innovation 
process and test for the effects that innovation contests might have on overall welfare and the 
willingness of innovators to cooperate. In the experiment, subjects are compensated for their 
innovations and – similar to chapter two – they have the possibility to license their 
innovations, which allows measuring their willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, two 
different kinds of innovation contests – a prize for the aggregate innovativeness and a prize 
for the best innovation – are compared to a benchmark treatment without a contest. The first 
contest is implemented by a relative payoff-scheme compensating the most innovative 
subject, whereby the prize for the aggregate innovativeness is implemented by awarding the 
most valuable innovation with a bonus. In the benchmark treatment, subjects are compensated 
for the number and quality of their innovations. 
The results demonstrate that the willingness to cooperate decreases in both types of 
contests in comparison to the benchmark treatment as royalty fees substantially increase. 
Nevertheless, the actual cooperation does not change, as subjects continue to use others’ 
innovations as often as in the benchmark treatment – presumably because they are eager to 
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win the contest – thus ignoring higher royalty fees. From a welfare perspective, there is no 
positive effect of contests, since the total innovation activity does not change across 
treatments. However, the welfare analysis does not include the costs for implementing the 
innovation contests: assuming that states bear substantial costs for organizing and financing 
the contests, the overall welfare effects might become substantially negative. With respect to 
policy implications, the results can be interpreted as questioning the positive effects of 
innovation contests, since they lead to a diminishing willingness to cooperate among 
innovators while fostering no positive effects on the individuals’ innovativeness and thus 
potentially incurring negative overall welfare effects. Furthermore, as royalty fees are 
increasing due to a contest structure, this instrument might have a further counterproductive 
effect when it is used as an additional tool to the existing structure of IP rights: since the 
effects of these instruments might overlap, the resulting incentive structure might be highly 
undesirable from a policy perspective. 
The fourth chapter – “The effectiveness of public subsidies for private innovations. An 
experimental approach” – examines another financial instrument used quite frequently to 
stimulate innovation, namely subsidies provided to firms to foster the development of 
innovative products and services. Previous discussions in different disciplines of innovation 
research have yielded highly ambiguous results regarding the effects of subsidies on 
innovativeness and welfare. Therefore, the evidence reported in this chapter adds to the 
discussion of the effectiveness of public subsidies in fostering private innovation activity with 
a laboratory experiment, again based on the Scrabble-like word creation task. 
Once again, the subjects’ goal in this experiment is to generate income by creating and 
extending words with the possibility to set a license fee on created words over multiple 
periods, thus simulating a sequential innovation process. This experiment and its distinct 
treatments allow testing whether innovators behave differently in a setting with a subsidy 
compared to a setting without a subsidy. The treatments are organized in a within-subjects 
design to capture the effects of changes in subsidization. In particular, a benchmark treatment 
without subsidies is tested against a treatment with additional material resources allocated in 
the form of a free letter in each period in a first experiment. In a second experiment, the 
benchmark is compared to a treatment with direct monetary resources allocated in the form of 
additional money amounting to the cost of one letter in each period. 
Overall, the results show that subsidies do not yield positive outcomes in welfare and 
innovativeness. While additional material resources induce no change in welfare, additional 
monetary resources even have negative welfare effects. Moreover, a crowding-out of private 
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investment occurs following the introduction of subsidies. Consequently, subjects’ individual 
average incomes increase due to the additional resources, although the innovation activity and 
overall welfare remain unchanged. Furthermore, with subsidies, producing more basic 
innovations is encouraged, while the creation of more sophisticated innovations is 
discouraged. Subsidies do not have an influence on the cooperation behavior among subjects 
measured by the level of license fees. From a policy perspective, the results indicate that the 
use of subsidies as a tool to foster innovativeness and welfare might be questionable. This 
would apply all the more when including the cost for the subsidy itself into the welfare 
analysis, which would show a negative overall effect of innovation subsidies. 
While chapters two to four present novel empirical evidence on the design of optimal 
innovation policy instruments, chapter five adopts a broader, methodological perspective. 
Entitled “Experimental approaches to innovation research”, the chapter discusses the 
advantages of conducting laboratory experiments as an additional method in the “toolbox” of 
innovation research. As policy makers aim to foster private innovation activity, a large 
number of methods have been suggested to measure the effects of the specific instruments. 
However, the established methods in innovation research have been criticized for being 
unable to provide counterfactual evidence, leading to the establishment of a new field of 
laboratory experiments covering questions of innovation research. The final contribution 
highlights this discussion and its methodological foundations. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the methodological development, the features of the 
different established approaches in innovation research are outlined, namely neoclassical 
models, ‘traditional’ empirical research, natural experiments, randomized field experiments 
and laboratory experiments. Explicating the advantages and limitations of lab experiments, it 
is suggested that lab experiments can provide new insights in the domains of analyzing 
existing and developing new policy instruments, as well as measuring their welfare 
implications by creating and comparing individual behavioral patterns in counterfactual 
situations. Furthermore, to highlight the recent progress in experimental innovation research, 
a literature review of 18 laboratory studies is conducted, encompassing the topics of IP rights, 
financial instruments, payment schemes as well as R&D competition. Based on the placement 
of laboratory experiments in the broader methodological context of innovation research, the 
discussion of advantages and limitations of experiments, the recent contributions of 
behavioral evidence to innovation research and the overall applicability of experiments is 
discussed. Following Chetty (2015), a pragmatic use of laboratory experiments is suggested, 
emphasizing that whenever experiments can contribute additional insights and their 
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methodological advantages outweigh the limitations, behavioral evidence can be considered a 
valuable extension to innovation research and provide vital policy recommendations. 
Overall, this dissertation provides new insights into the effects of the policy instruments 
intellectual property rights, contests and subsidies by providing counterfactual evidence based 
on laboratory experiments as well as a discussion of the experimental methodology in 
innovation research. However, the four studies presented of course only constitute a starting 
point for further research in the emerging field of innovation research. Future research should 
therefore extend the use of experimental methods for deriving counterfactual evidence on 
other policy instruments to measure their effectiveness and efficiency and thus enrich the 
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In this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or 
hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment. We introduce a novel Scrabble-like 
creativity task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process. We use this 
task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to assign license fees 
to their innovations. We find intellectual property to have an adversely effect on welfare as 
innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated. Communication among innovators is 
not able to prevent this detrimental effect. Introducing intellectual property results in more 
basic innovations and subjects fail to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths. 
Subjects act more self-reliant and non-optimally in order to avoid paying license fees. Our 
results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovations, especially for 
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2.1. Introduction 
The question whether to grant intellectual property (IP) rights to innovators has been 
discussed widely in economics, law and politics. Proponents of IP rights argue that temporary 
monopoly rights granted through patents or copyright provide incentives by protecting 
innovators from imitation and allotting to them a part of the social surplus generated by 
subsequent innovators (Arrow 1962; Nordhaus 1969; Scherer 1972). Further, patents are 
assumed to induce disclosure of new technologies and therefore foster a swift and 
comprehensive diffusion of knowledge (Machlup 1958). These traditional arguments have 
been increasingly put to question. Opponents of IP rights argue that the creation of 
monopolies on innovations increases prices, which distorts resource allocations, causes 
inefficiencies and leads to welfare losses (Stiglitz 2008; Boldrin and Levine 2013). Moreover, 
too broad, too long, or too fragmented IP rights can give rise to gridlock and anticommons 
issues in downstream innovations (Heller and Eisenberg 1998).  
In this paper we contribute to the debate by means of a controlled real-effort laboratory 
experiment involving creativity. We introduce a novel design that allows us to create 
counterfactual situations and test directly the effects of IP rights on the innovation rate and 
welfare of a laboratory economy. 
The issues of what are the optimal extent and nature of IP rights have been long debated, 
but neither theoretical nor empirical research has provided a final answer. Theoretical results 
cut both ways. Conventional wisdom is largely derived from static models, and does not 
robustly survive in dynamic, sequential innovation models that best describe sectors 
characterized by cumulative research (Scotchmer 1991). Dynamic models offer a less positive 
view of the effect of IP on the rate of innovations and thus aggregate welfare. Green and 
Scotchmer (1995) study the division of profits between sequential innovators and suggest that 
it is desirable to minimize patent life. Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) analyze IP regimes with 
and without research exemptions. They find ambiguous effects and show that firms ex ante 
always prefer a full patent protection regime. In contrast, Bessen and Maskin (2009) 
implement a model with sequential and complementary innovations, finding that IP rights are 
welfare-reducing, and, in some cases, are not even preferred by the inventor, who favors 
instead to publicly disclose her innovations. Going a step further, Boldrin and Levine (2008) 
theoretically and empirically show that innovators can earn competitive rents even in 
complete absence of monopoly power. Hunt (2004) investigates the role of the patentability 
standard in a sequential innovation model in which profitability of inventions is eroded by 
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new inventions. He finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between patentability standards 
and the rate of innovation. Using an asymmetric-ability multistage R&D race model, 
Fershtman and Markovich (2010) find that the opportunity of licensing in a patent system 
might be superior to a system with strong patent rights. Summing up, the dynamic models 
focus on the trade-off between securing sufficient incentives to current and future inventors. 
The overall result of the theoretical analyses, though, seems to crucially depend on the 
assumptions of the respective model. 
Empirical research also yields mixed evidence. Results on the impact of IP rights on 
innovativeness range from a positive influence (Ernst 2001), an “inverted U” shaped relation 
(Aghion et al. 2002; Furukawa 2007; Hashmi 2013), a negligible impact (Dosi et al. 2006; 
Lerner 2009) to a negative influence (Qian 2007; Williams 2013). 
Methodologically, both theoretical and empirical analyses are second-best with respect to 
the observation of a clean counterfactual situation. The absence of conclusive evidence might 
be due to the lack of natural experiments that could allow us to observe a counterfactual, non-
existent patent-free world (Sørensen et al. 2010; Hall and Harhoff 2012). 
In this paper we exploit the unique characteristic of laboratory experiments of allowing to 
easily build counterfactual situations while retaining control over several confounding factors. 
We recreate a sequential innovation setting similar to Bessen and Maskin (2009), which fits 
best to copyrighted non-rivalrous goods and the respective industries such as software and 
semiconductors. In the spirit of Scotchmer (2004) we use this setting to explore the effects of 
IP rights on innovativeness and welfare.  
The advantages of the laboratory in terms of control come at a cost. The laboratory creates 
an artificial environment that might lack external validity. In bringing IP rights to the lab we 
hence face a trade-off between replicating the complex interactions of creative, sequential 
innovation industries and making the task manageable for an experimental session 
characterized by time and monetary restrictions. This basic trade-off has been tackled in 
various ways in the still sparse experimental literature in the economics of innovation and IP 
rights. A laboratory task adapted to analyze innovation should include the use of both 
financial and creative resources, and should recreate both the incentive structure and the 
uncertainty of actual innovation settings. Moreover, it should provide an innovation space that 
is countable, in order to allow the researchers to analyze the data quantitatively. These 
constraints have been usually met by developing search tasks over some large, 
multidimensional space unknown to the subjects but controlled by the experimenter (see, for 
instance, Cantner et al. 2009; Meloso et al. 2009; Buccafusco and Sprigman 2010; Ederer and 
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Manso 2013; Buchanan and Wilson 2014). Another set of papers, has instead forfeited control 
over the results of the creation process to focus on creativity only (see, for instance, 
Buccafusco and Sprigman 2010, who let the subjects write poems). Toubia (2006) is, to the 
best of our knowledge, the only paper implementing a sequential ‘ideation’ task that requires 
creativity and provides some sort of countable space in which different incentive schemes for 
creativity can be studied.  
To achieve a reasonable balance, and include both dynamics and creativity, we employ the 
design of Crosetto (2010) and develop a Scrabble-like word-creation task. The task involves 
creative use of scarce resources (letters) over a known but vast space (all the existing words), 
thus at the same time implementing creative effort and granting complete control of the 
results. We implement (strict) sequentiality by allowing only three-letter words to be created 
from individual letters, while longer words have to be built extending shorter ones, one letter 
at a time. Subjects are rewarded for creating words. Additionally, subjects can license, for a 
fee, their words and extensions to other subjects to serve as base for extensions in further 
periods. 
Within this artificial but rich setting we implement two treatments, across subjects. First, 
we directly test the effects of IP rights on innovativeness and welfare by imposing two 
alternative IP regimes: a no-IP regime, where all license fees are exogenously set to zero, and 
an IP regime in which license fees are determined endogenously by subjects for each newly-
created word. Second, we test the robustness of individual licensing behavior in the case of 
stronger social interaction, by enabling or not chat communication. We thus investigate 
whether communication among innovators builds up altruistic norms that foster cooperation 
and decrease overall license fees for innovations.  
We find that the presence of IP rights results in less frequent and less sophisticated 
innovations and significantly reduces total welfare by 20 to 30 percent. This is due to IP rights 
causing a shift in behavior from more valuable, longer words towards less valuable, shorter 
ones. At the same time subjects, in their quest to avoid paying license fees, forego innovation 
opportunities that are instead seized in absence of IP rights. The detrimental effect of 
introducing IP rights holds both with and without communication.  
2.2. Experimental Design 
2.2.1. Related experimental literature 
Experimenters trying to deal with intellectual property issues face two sets of problems when 
designing their tasks. First, they need to translate the idea of innovation in the lab. This means 
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allowing the subjects to use both financial and creative resources, but within a task in which it 
is possible to accurately assess quality and quantity of the goods produced. Introducing 
creativity and skills is crucial to obtain external validity of the results; control is crucial to 
allow for treatment comparisons and to derive robust results. Second, they must recreate a 
multi-period dynamic landscape in a relatively short-lived experimental session. 
In order to deal with these basic design problems a first group of experiments chooses to 
model the creative process using search over complex spaces. Subject explore the search 
space looking for some optimal solution that yields higher payoffs, and that the experimenter 
knows and controls. Often this optimal solution is randomly chosen by the experimenter over 
the space. Meloso et al. (2009) use a combinatorial task, with an optimal non-obvious 
solution, and find that participants disseminate intellectual discoveries better in a market than 
in a patent system. Cantner et al. (2009) model R&D as a multidimensional search process 
with uncertainty, in which the best option is randomly determined. They investigate 
competition for innovation in a patent race scenario to classify investor types, finding that 
most subjects use objective investment criteria. Dimmig and Erlei (2013) use a similar task 
and show that the introduction of patenting has only a minor impact on R&D behavior. Ederer 
and Manso (2013) use a search task in a multi-dimensional space. They find that a 
combination of tolerance for early failure and rewards for long-term success are most 
effective in fostering innovation. Buchanan and Wilson (2014) implement a search task that 
consists of creating colors with the aim of finding the ‘color of the day’, randomly set by the 
experimenter, and introduce trade. In their IP treatment the creation of non-rivalrous 
knowledge goods is highest; however, prices increase as substantial monopoly profits are 
acquired by the innovators. In the absence of IP, Buchanan and Wilson still identify the 
incentive to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, but IP theft as well. They also implement 
chat communication among subjects to enable bargaining and cooperation. 
By choosing to implement search tasks, the aforementioned experiments abstract away 
from the crucial features of creativity and individual skills. In some of the designs, finding the 
‘right’ combination is just a matter of luck and enough trials. Innovations are usually not 
created through such a process. A smaller set of papers choose instead to implement outright 
“creative” tasks, i.e. tasks involving creative skills rather than the search of an often randomly 
chosen optimal solution. Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010) ask their subjects to write poems 
and subsequently implement a market for them. They find that the preferences of IP creators, 
owners, and purchasers are unstable and dependent on the initial distribution of IP rights, and 
that there is a substantial valuation asymmetry between creators and purchasers of IP, similar 
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to the well-known endowment effect. Such designs capture the creativity core of innovations 
better, but forfeit control – it is impossible to accurately assess which poem is ‘better’ or 
‘more creative’ in the set. 
In this paper we develop a task that integrates both creativity and control of the outcome. 
We employ a Scrabble-like real effort word creation game originally introduced by Crosetto 
(2010). In this task subjects innovate over a familiar space (their language), using both 
economic (experimental money) and cognitive (creative effort) resources. The production 
process requires creativity and skill, but its results are countable and can be used to create 
precise statistics and comparisons across conditions. By allowing subjects to extend already 
created words, we induce sequentiality and dynamics in an intuitive way. Our approach is 
similar to Toubia (2006). In his ‘ideation game’ subjects are faced with complex problems 
(i.e., “How can the impact of the U.N. Security Council be increased”) and must come up 
with ideas. Ideas can be ‘new’ or build on an existing idea, thus introducing sequentiality. The 
value of ideas is a function of the incentive scheme introduced. The game implements 
different incentive schemes, including a flat condition, in which subjects are paid for 
participation but ideas are worthless in themselves, a piece-rate condition in which each idea 
was worth one token, and a citation condition, in which ideas that are more built upon and 
extended are more valuable. Differently from Toubia (2006), our experiment allows for an 
evaluation of the output of the innovation process (in our case, words) that is independent of 
the incentive scheme adopted; words are valued according to an objective Scrabble-like rule 
assigning value to each letter, thus allowing to assess the total production of the economy by 
an objective standard known to all participants.  
2.2.2. Design 
Our experimental design, originally proposed by Crosetto (2010), is inspired by the board 
game Scrabble with the addition of a price on letters, strict sequentiality in word creation and 
IP rights on created words. Buying letters is a risky investment and sequentiality and IP rights 
add a strategic dimension to the game.  
The task of the subjects is to create words. They do so by using letters, which they buy 
from the experimenters. Each word produced generates an immediate payoff that corresponds 
to the sum of the values of the letters used in the respective word. This value is the same as in 
Scrabble, roughly determined by the inverse of a letter’s absolute number in the set. For 
example, an a is worth 1, a b 3, an x 8.3  
                                                 
3 The details of the letterset used are given in appendix B, together with the English translation of the original 
experimental instructions. 
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There are two types of words in the experiment. With the letters they own, subjects can 
either form a three-letter word (we call it a root), or extend existing words (an extension). 
Roots can be produced with any three letters, as long as the word exists. For example, with t, r 
and a, a subject can produce art or rat. Extensions are generated by adding one letter in any 
position of a word: for instance, cat can be extended into cart, or cats, or chat.4 Extensions 
can be further extended as long as the language allows: for instance, cart can be further 
extended into chart. Roots can be used to generate alternative extension paths and the amount 
of possible extensions stemming from each word is usually long and branched. We hence 
implement in our experiment a required inventive step of three letters for new inventions and 
one letter for marginal innovations. Table 2.1 shows all the extension paths of cat, along with 
their value. 
 
Table 2.1. All allowed extension paths of cat 
root 
extensions 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
cat (5) 
cant (6) 




canto (7) cantor (8)  
cants (7) cantons (8)  









carets (8)  
carpet (10)  














chant (10) chants (11) 
chasten (12) 
chastes (12) chastens (13) 
chart (10) charts (11) 
chats (10) chaste (11) 
cheat (10) cheats (11) 
     
coat (6) coast (7) coasts (8)   coats (7)   
     
scat (6) scant (7) scats (7) 
scants (8) 
scantly (12) 




                                                 
4 For the sake of clarity, all examples are reported in English, even if the actual experiment was run in German. 
While the actual words that can be created vary across languages, the basic rules and the ideas behind the 
examples are general. 
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It is clear from table 2.1 that longer words tend to yield higher payoffs. Extensions are 
more profitable than roots, rewarding the extender with the full value of the word extended 
and not just with the value of his marginal contribution. For example, extending cat into cart 
costs the subject the letter r, worth 1 token, and yields a payoff of 6 tokens. To keep the 
experiment simple and manageable we rule out technological obsolescence: the full value of 
the extended word is transferred to the extension, with no discounting. 
This structure allows us to introduce intellectual property rights in a simple and intuitive 
way by allowing the subjects to impose a license fee on the use of their created word for 
extensions. Through this fee subjects can secure part of the surplus created in extending for 
themselves. The surplus is generated by reusing the same resources, i.e. letters. We let 
subjects choose the level of the fee as a percentage, from 0 to 100%, of the value of the 
licensed word. In the example, the owner of cat (value 5) can choose to impose a fee that 
ranges from 0 to 5 tokens to the subject that wishes to extend cat into cart. License fees 
enable us to address in a simple way the central problem in sequential IP rights, the split of 
profits between upstream and downstream innovators (Scotchmer 1991). 
2.2.2.1. Treatments 
We implement two different treatments over this basic structure, in a factorial 2x2 between-
subjects design. First, we manipulate exogenously the presence or absence of intellectual 
property rights. In the Intellectual Property (IP) treatments, subjects can impose a license fee 
on the access to their words to others. This is not possible in noIP treatments and all words are 
publicly available at no extra fee. noIP treatments are equivalent to exogenously setting all 
license fees to 0%. We can thus directly test the effect of IP rights on the rate of word creation 
and hence on payoffs at the individual and group levels.  
Second, we manipulate the possibility for subjects to communicate with each other. In chat 
treatments we introduce a chat box in which subjects can communicate with all others in their 
group. In noChat treatments subjects cannot communicate. These treatments allow us to 
observe the effect of communication as a means of facilitating cooperation on individual and 
collective performance. 
2.2.2.2. Design details 
With this general description in mind, we now move to the details of the task. The game is 
played by randomly matched groups of 4 subjects. The composition of groups is constant 
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during the whole game. Within groups, subjects play sequentially, as in turn-based games.5 
Subjects start the experiment with an endowment of 75 tokens (1 token converts to €0.12, so 
that the initial endowment is of €9) and 4 randomly pre-assigned letters. The experiment lasts 
for 25 periods. In each period, each subject has to make at most three choices: an investment 
decision, a production choice and, in IP treatments only, an intellectual property decision. 
 
Investment  
Subjects buy a letter at a fixed price of 2 tokens. Letters are randomly drawn from the letter 
set. The random sequence governing letter draws is predetermined and fixed, though 
unknown to the subjects, in order to make results from different groups and treatments fully 
comparable. The average value of a drawn letter is 1.87, so that the price is slightly above the 
expected value, which makes buying a letter a risky investment with potentially negative 
returns. Subjects can skip the investment phase and choose not to buy any letter.  
 
Production  
Subjects are then given the opportunity to produce a word. They can create a new three-letter 
word (a root), extend an existing word by adding exactly one letter in any position (an 
extension), or do not produce anything and pass.  
All submitted roots or extensions are spellchecked by the system. Moreover, to give 
stronger incentives to be creative, subjects are not allowed to submit a word previously 
created by other subjects. All validly created words enter a public word repository that each 
subject has at the center of its screen at any time. The list of existing words can be sorted 
alphabetically or by word length, value, and, for IP treatments, word owner and license fee 
attached to the word.  
 
Intellectual Property 
In IP treatments and in case subjects produced a word (root or extension alike) in the period, 
they are asked to set a license fee that will apply to their newly-created word. Subjects submit 
their choice using a line of radio buttons consisting of 11 discrete values, ranging from 0% to 
100% in steps of 10%, with no default value selected. Subjects can impose license fees only 
to their marginal contribution to the word created. In the case of a root, license fees are 
imposed on the whole three-letter word. In the case of an extension, the license fee is imposed 
only on the added letter. 
                                                 
5 Synchronous decisions have been ruled out both for reasons of software complexity and in order to avoid issues 
with duplicated words and time pressure.  
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Let us work out an example. Subject A creates cat, a root of value 5, and imposes a license 
fee of 60%. Subject B then extends cat into chat. Accordingly, subject B has to pay a license 
fee of 3 tokens (5 times 0.6) to subject A for using cat, but can in turn impose a license fee on 
her marginal contribution to the word, the letter h. Her payoff for creating chat is the value of 
chat (9 tokens) minus the fee paid (3 tokens) and it is hence 6. If subject B sets a license fee 
80% on h (the value of h is 4), then a potential extender of chat will have to pay 3 tokens to 
subject A and 3.2 (80% of h’s 4) to subject B. All these computations are automatically 
performed by the computer that allocates license fees to the respective marginal contributors.  
By imposing license fees on words, subjects can gain additional revenue, when their words 
are extended by others. However, on the group level, license fees are nothing but a zero-sum 
mechanism to redistribute wealth as there are no transaction costs. 
 
Idle phase 
When it is not their turn, subjects face the main board of the game.6 Here they can keep track 
of their earnings, follow what other subjects are doing, inspect and sort the list of words 
created and use an interactive spellchecker for free.7 
In chat treatments, the main board incorporates a chat box where subjects can 
communicate with each other. Messages sent to the chat box are instantaneously visualized by 
all the other 3 subjects in the group. 
2.2.3. Theoretical properties of the design 
Our design aims at recreating in the lab a sequential, cumulative innovation setting inspired 
by the models of Scotchmer (2004) and most closely Bessen and Maskin (2009). In particular, 
we induce strict sequentiality, since each extension is created from an existing word by adding 
one and only one letter.  
We translate the concept of innovation in the lab by letting subjects be creative within a 
familiar space that is vast but intuitively searchable. Moreover, the space is countable, as it 
resides totally within the chosen dictionary. Every word that can be created according to our 
rules is fully described by two dimensions: its value that is translated in immediate payoff at 
the moment of creation and its extendibility. For each root we computed the number and 
value of all possible extensions. Recursively, we did the same for each extension. We hence 
have a precise and complete map of the innovation space facing our subjects. 
                                                 
6 A screenshot of the main board can be found in the instructions in appendix B. 
7 The spellchecker has been provided to enable the subjects to explore the space of words and make individual 
skills less prominent. The spellchecker is based on the system’s internal dictionary – in our case, the standard 
Windows dictionary for German. 
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Creating extensions requires effort and the presence of roots to be extended, but the reward 
is higher. This models the effort needed to invent in a natural way: generating complex ideas 
requires both effort and the ability to stand on the shoulders of giants. Our payoff structure 
implements constant returns to innovations. That is, an extension is worth exactly its marginal 
contribution (the added letter) plus the value of the root it is using. Absent any way to transfer 
the value of the root back to the root creator, in the form of license fees or citations (Hall et al. 
2005) (in noIP treatments) then extensions are a much better deal than roots. This payoff 
structure best describes the situation of basic science – in which the first contributions lay 
down the foundations, allowing subsequent contributions to carry most of the value – or in the 
software industry – in which modern software technologies are built on thousands of 
algorithms, hardware, drivers, etc. that have been accumulated over the years.  
Moreover, our experiment includes a key feature of technology markets: the fact that 
“imitators do not produce direct ‘knockoffs,’ but rather differentiated products. [... T]he 
different R&D paths behind these products permit innovative complementarities. Imitation 
then increases the ‘biodiversity’ of the technology [...], improving prospects for future 
innovation” (Bessen and Maskin 2009, 613). Extensions not only incorporate the existing 
root, but enlarge it in different directions, increasing the ‘biodiversity’ and opening up paths 
for future extensions. Discoveries work through improvement rather than replacement. 
Finally, as in Bessen and Maskin (2009, 613) innovations in our experiment are 
complementary. Each innovator can take a different research line, i.e. produce different words 
given the same letters, or strike a different deal between value and extension potential, and 
thus enhance the probability that more sophisticated products are created. 
2.2.4. Testable hypotheses 
What is the effect of IP rights on innovation? 
Our IP treatments are designed to provide an experimental answer to this issue. In our task, 
overall welfare depends on the relative number of extensions built per each root. Since the 
expected net value of buying one letter is negative (the expected value of randomly drawing a 
letter is 1.87 for a cost of 2), a group only producing roots will face a decline in welfare, as 
compared with the initial endowment. Extensions allow groups to use their resources (letters) 
several times, producing net welfare gains as investment costs are sunk.  
In IP treatments the presence of license fees affects the allocation of the surplus generated 
by extensions between the upstream and the downstream inventors. IP rights give incentives 
to innovate, but at the same time impose costs on downstream innovators, and hence act as a 
brake on the creation of more complex, derivative inventions. As in Scotchmer (1991), the 
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effect of IP rights on overall welfare are hence ex-ante ambiguous and we do not posit a 
specific hypothesis on the matter. 
 
What is the effect of communication on innovation? 
We further investigate the individual motivation in contributing to sequential innovation. 
Based on the findings of the public goods literature, where communication leads to more 
cooperation (see, among others, Bochet et al. 2006) and the studies pointing to high altruistic 
contributions in open innovative communities (Lakhani and Hippel 2003), we expect 
communication to have a positive effect on the innovation rate. We therefore expect 
communicating subjects to build up group norms of low overall license fees independent of 
the IP framework. Lower fees would then lead to an increase in the number of extensions for 
each root, allowing the groups to reach more sophisticated innovations.  
 
Which level of license fee will prevail in the long run? 
In IP treatments, in which subjects are free to set their preferred license fee, our task 
replicates a social dilemma situation. Setting low or no license fees increases the chances of 
collectively reaching longer, profitable words, providing a public benefit; higher fees, on the 
other hand, are likely to generate higher private returns. In this context setting low fees can be 
interpreted as cooperation, since it potentially boosts the group’s overall welfare.  
Moreover, robust evidence from public good games hint at decreasing levels of 
cooperation over repetitions of the game and at a strong effect of initial values (see, for 
instance, Croson 2007; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). As in public good games, we 
therefore expect a path dependency following the initial decisions, whereby license fees 
chosen in the beginning determine the long term average level of license fees within groups. 
We expect subjects to impose increasing license fees as the game proceeds; we also expect the 
level and rate of increase to be lower in chat treatments, in which cooperation is facilitated. 
2.2.5. Experimental procedures 
Experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Behavioral Economics at the University of 
Göttingen in August and September 2013. The experimental software was written in python 
and adapted from Crosetto (2010). Participants were recruited with ORSEE Greiner (2004) 
and were allowed to participate in one session only. We recruited 214 participants. Prior to the 
experiment, participants were exposed to a language-test to ensure a full working knowledge 
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of German.8 22 subjects failed the test and had to be excluded from participation. The 
remaining 192 participants took part in 18 sessions of the experiment.  
We implemented a pure between, 2x2 factorial design crossing the dimensions 
chat/noChat and IP/noIP. Subjects were allocated to 48 groups of 4 players, 12 for each 
treatment as summarized in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. Overview of the treatment conditions 
 no communication communication 









Once allowed to participate and before the start of the main task, subjects went through an 
incentivized word-finding control task.9 At the end of the 25 periods of the main task and 
after being notified their final score and payoff, participants were asked to complete a short 
not incentivized questionnaire, including demographics, controls for language skills, 
familiarity with word tasks and risk aversion. Overall participants were 24.1 years old and 
53.6% were female. Sessions lasted around 90 minutes. The 192 participants earned €16.19 
on average, with a minimum payoff of €7.1 and a maximum of €28.5. 
2.3. Results 
In this section, we first report treatment effects, analyzing the impact of both the IP and chat 
manipulations on the total number, quality and value of created words. Since the game is 
path-dependent, we then test the robustness of our findings by controlling for the actual 
decision sets faced by each subject at each decision. We then turn to the individual and group 
level and run regressions to check if results survive when group and individual heterogeneity 
are taken into account. The focus on individual choices allows us to check to what extent 
individual choices were consistent with individual, or group payoff maximization. Finally, we 
analyze the prevailing levels of license fees, their dynamics and whether their level impacts 
the innovation rate. 
 
                                                 
8 The test was developed by Kirchkamp and Reiß (2011). The participants had to find the correct words or forms 
to complete sentences in a German text. 
9 The task was adapted from Eckartz et al. (2012). For details see appendix A.  
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2.3.1. Aggregate results: words and value created 
We first test if and to what extent the aggregate output created in our experiment is affected 
by the presence of IP rights and communication. To measure output we use the total net value 
created in each group, i.e., the value of all the words created, minus the cost of the letters used 
to create them.  
 
Table 2.3. Overview of words and value created by treatment 
  noChat/noIP noChat/IP chat/noIP chat/IP 














 median 295.5 210 235.5 209 
 min 200 103 155 99 
 max 350 274 404 280 







































Table 2.3 summarizes the core results on words and net value created. In the table, the total 
amount of letters bought represents the level of investment in the group. The average word 
length, together with the average word value, measure the degree of sophistication reached. 
The number of roots and extensions measures the share of base and follow-up inventions, 
respectively. All measures are calculated at the group level. 
2.3.1.1. The effect of intellectual property rights 
We find that noIP treatments result in significantly higher total net value, with and without 
chat communication (Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=-1.675, 
p=.094; for noChat/IP and noChat/noIP z=-3.464, p=.0005). The difference is rather large. In 
absence of property rights with (without) chat communication the average net value created is 
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about 40% (33%) higher. The groups performing worst in the noIP treatments achieve a total 
net value that is 50% (100% without chat) higher than the worst group of the IP treatments. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the distribution of total net value across noIP groups dominates the one 
for the IP groups, both within the chat and the noChat treatments. 
 
Figure 2.1. Total net value by treatment and group 
 
 
These striking differences are reflected in the characteristics of the words created. Without 
IP words are longer (MWU-test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=-2.483, p=.013; for noChat/IP 
and noChat/noIP z=-2.944, p=.0032) and tend to be more valuable on average (MWU-test for 
chat/IP and chat/noIP z=-1.559, p=.119; for noChat/IP and noChat/noIP z=-3.233, p=.0012). 
In contrast, the average investment is almost equal across treatments, as measured by the 
number of letters bought (MWU-test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=0.521, p=.6024; for 
noChat/IP and noChat/noIP z=-0.406, p=.6850). 
 
RESULT 1: Introducing IP decreases overall welfare as a comparable level of investment is 
transformed into less sophisticated and less valuable innovations. 
 
We now analyze what drives these treatment differences. Recall that a group as a whole 
does not bear any additional costs when building on existing roots or prior extensions, 
whereby the letters already used generate their inherent payoff again. Letters already bought 
can be seen as an endowment which was paid for beforehand, i.e. there are only sunk costs 
but potential gains in creating extensions. As a consequence, overall welfare increases with 



















































Figure 2.2. Number of roots and extensions created, by treatment 
 
Note: Error bars show st.err. of the mean. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the average over groups of the number of roots and extensions by 
treatment. There are substantial differences across treatments. In the IP treatments roots are 
built significantly more often relative to extensions. In chat/IP (noChat/IP) 71.1% (71.9%) of 
created words are extensions, whereas in chat/noIP (noChat/noIP) the share is 79.3% 
(78.5%). Both differences are statistically significant. Moreover, in the noIP treatments more 
extensions are created on average from each root (MWU-test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=-
2.830, p=.0047; for noChat/IP and noChat/noIP z=-2.688, p=.0072). Finally, not only in IP 
treatments subject created more roots, but these roots had a higher, though not significantly 
so, extendibility potential, that is, the value of all possible extensions path for each root (2632 
for IP vs. 2374 for noIP). This is in line with intuition: in IP treatments subjects had 
incentives to create more extendible roots since they could expect a higher stream of royalties. 
Despite this higher potential, in IP treatments there were less extensions per root. 
 
RESULT 2a: The deterioration in welfare due to introducing IP can partially be ascribed to 
















chat/IP noChat/IP chat/noIP noChat/noIP
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We consider another channel through which IP rights could cause detrimental effects on 
total net value. Subjects might be characterized by a preference for their own creations. That 
is, they might refrain from extending words created by other players and restrict attention to 
their own. This might be due to an enhanced familiarity with one’s own creations, or, in IP 
treatments, to avoid license fee payments. If this behavior emerges, profitable opportunities 
might be missed and the total net value of the group might end up being lower. 
This behavior might stem from two different strategies. On the one hand, subjects might be 
rationally avoiding paying fees and choose to create those words or extensions that give the 
highest payoff individually but not collectively. In other words, subjects in our IP treatments 
face collective action problems, while subjects in noIP treatments do not. On the other hand, 
subjects might show an aversion to license fees even when paying a fee might be the 
individually optimal choice. In this paragraph, we restrict attention to the preference for own 
words, irrespective of the reason. We discuss the rationality of this behavior in section 2.3.3 
below, where we analyze choices at the individual level. 
We investigate the existence of a potential preference for own words by assigning an 
originator to each word. The originator is the subject who created the root for the respective 
word.10Assuming an even distribution of letters and skills, if players do not take into account 
the property status of the word they wish to extend, about one extension in four should 
originate from the same subject, while three out of four should originate from other subjects.11 
Higher shares might be expected, however, due to some path dependency causing subjects to 
find extensions to their own words more easily. Additionally, subjects might think in advance 
of a stream of extensions when building a root and hence create a word that they are able to 
extend by themselves as the game proceeds. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity we will 
take a share of 25% as our benchmark. Figure 2.3 gives the average share of extensions built 
on self-originated words by treatment.   
                                                 
10 Consider, for instance, a four letter word that was created by subject A and then extended by another subject 
B: the word is assigned subject A as its originator. This definition strongly simplifies the analysis as we do not 
have to deal with multiple owners and are still able to make meaningful comparisons based on an appropriate 
number of observations. 
11 This is the share that should prevail if players do not care about the property of the word they want to extend, 
and just choose the best option available to them at any time. This is also the expected behavior in the noIP 
treatments, since in those treatments all words have the same property status – they belong to everyone, and no-
one.  
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Figure 2.3. Share of extensions of self-originated words by treatments 
 
Note: Error bars show st.err. of the mean. 
 
The figure shows that in the noIP treatments the share of self-originated words is near to 
the 25% benchmark that we assumed for the case of no preference for own words. In IP 
treatments, on the other hand, the share is higher than 30%, significantly so with respect to 
noIP treatments (MWU-test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=1.877, p=.0605; for noChat/IP and 
noChat/noIP z=2.543, p=.011). 
 
RESULT 2b: The deterioration in welfare due to introducing IP can partially be ascribed to 
a shift towards favoring self-originated innovations to avoid paying license fees.  
2.3.1.2. The effect of communication 
When comparing the communication treatments conditional on the IP regime, we find no 
significant differences in total net value (MWU-test for chat/IP and noChat/IP z=-0.549, 
p=.5832; for chat/noIP and noChat/noIP z=-1.444, p=.1487). 
The number of letters bought is significantly higher when there is no chat communication 
for the noIP treatment (MWU-test for chat/IP and noChat/IP z=-0.668, p=.5043; for 
chat/noIP and noChat/noIP z=-1.852, p=.0640). The difference for noIP is quite relevant and 






























length (MWU-test for chat/noIP and noChat/noIP z=-0.808, p=.4189; for chat/IP and 
noChat/IP z=-0.751, p=.4529). The effect of communication on word length is not significant 
in the IP treatments, while in the noIP case the groups allowed to communicate produce 
slightly shorter words than the groups that were not (MWU-test for chat/noIP and 
noChat/noIP z=-1.877, p=.0605; for chat/IP and noChat/IP z=-0.866, p=.3864).  
These results might be somewhat misleading since not all groups that were offered chat 
communication actually used it. In chat/IP (chat/noIP) only 58% (75%) of groups sent at least 
one message. We can further define a criterion that identifies groups that actually used the 
chat communication in a meaningful way, i.e., to discuss the game or possible strategies.12 
Only 42% (66%) of the groups in chat/IP (chat/noIP) did so. However, these groups achieved 
a higher total net value – 219 (263) on average against 167.86 (231.25) on average – than 
groups that did not use the chat. These differences are only weakly to not significant (MWU-
test for IP z= -1.627, p=.1038; for noIP z=-1.189, p=.2345). Recall that in noChat/IP the 
average created net value amounts to 204.92 and in noChat/noIP to 288.25. Accordingly, 
groups using chat communication in a meaningful way are still incapable of substantially 
outperforming the average noChat group. We are further not able to identify whether groups 
offered communication and using it perform better because of the communication itself or 
because of a self-selection process, whereby more cooperative or more capable group 
members communicate more often. We conclude that introducing communication by no 
means precludes the detrimental effects of introducing property rights identified in our 
experiment. 
 
RESULT 3: Allowing for communication has no effect on overall welfare, regardless of the 
established IP regime. 
2.3.2. Controlling for the actual choice set 
The results reported above are strong, but are crucially dependent on the path that was taken 
by the different groups in terms of extendibility of the words created. Each choice by each 
subject not only gives an immediate payoff, but also shapes the current and future choice sets 
                                                 
12 We define this criterion as being true if players communicate to discuss game related topics and not just greet 
each other. Communication is defined as game related if they talk about something meaningful with respect to 
license fees (player 2: “Shall we keep the license fees down?”, player 1: „20 percent is fair :-)”, player 3: „agreed 
:)”, player 4: “Sounds good”), the words produced (player 1: “did you built miste out of mist or out of mit? 
@player 2”, player 2: “mist”), looking for help to find words (player 2: “do you have an idea for j?”, player 1: 
“hmm, no, that´s difficult”), making sure the rules of the experiment (player 3: “How many rounds are there? 
Till there are no letters left?”, […] player 1: „25 rounds, I think!“, player 4: „yes“) or discussing possible 
strategies (player 1: “does it make sense to buy a letter in each round? And we maybe always wait to press enter 
till the time is over to have more time for thinking?”, player 2: “ok”). 
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of all subjects. In this section, we take care of this problem by introducing an indicator of the 
value of a word relative to the actual choice set facing a subject at the moment of choice. 
Consider the actual choice set Cit given for each subject i in period t. This choice set is a 
function of the letters owned by player i and the existing words at time t. For each choice 
citϵCit we computed the immediate net payoff as π(cit), subtracting from the raw payoffs the 
license fee paid and the cost of the letter(s) used. We then compute, alongside the actual 
payoff πit the maximum Mit=max{π(cit),citϵCit} and minimum mit={π(cit),citϵCit} payoffs 
obtainable from Cit. 
The actual payoff πit is by definition smaller than or equal to the maximum Mit and greater 
than or equal to the minimum mit payoff obtainable. We then can calculate the relative net 
value of the actual choice by subject i at time t, henceforth RNVit, as: 
RNVit=(πit-mit)/(Mit-mit) 
Note that RNVit ϵ[0,1], m≤0, M≥0 and m≤c≤ M for all subjects, periods and treatments. 
This measure allows us to control for path dependency: higher values of the RNV imply better 
performance in the specific situation conditional on the actual choice set faced by the subject. 
Subjects clearly should aim to maximize the RNV as it maximizes payoffs.13 Table 2.4 shows 
the RNV for all treatments pooled over groups and periods. 
 
Table 2.4. Summary statistics of the Relative Net Value by treatments 
 RNV 
 average (sd) median min max 
noChat/noIP 0.392 
(0.0313) 0.387 0.356 0.450 
noChat/IP 0.317 
(0.0309) 0.311 0.274 0.378 
chat/noIP 0.366 
(0.0569) 0.358 0.272 0.461 
chat/IP 0.3233 
(0.0399) 0.333 0.253 0.389 
 
                                                 
13 Note that, however, using the RNV does not allow for checking if a decision was optimal for the group as a 
whole. To be capable of defining a decision as being optimal from a group’s perspective, we would have to 
account for all possible paths and future outcomes a root or extension opens up. It is technically possible to do 
so, but we argue that these calculations are way above the cognitive capabilities of subjects and therefore cannot 
be considered to measure the optimality of a given choice. Consequently, we build on this rather myopic 
maximization problem of an individual player.  
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RESULT 1, 2 and 3 are robust to the introduction of RNV rather than total net value. The 
Null that all RNVs are equal across treatments can be rejected (Kruskal-Wallis test χ²=19.913 
with df=3, p=.0002). We find significant differences between IP treatments conditional on the 
communication regime (MWU-test for chat/IP and chat/noIP z=-2.136, p=.0327; for 
noChat/IP and noChat/noIP z=-3.811, p=.0001), but no significant differences between 
communication treatments conditional on the IP regime (MWU-test for chat/IP and 
noChat/IP z=0.520, p=.6033; for chat/noIP and noChat/noIP z=-1.501, p=.1333). 
While the total value created is always weakly increasing over periods, the RNV can in 
principle increase or decrease. It increases if subjects learn to better exploit the opportunities 
they face. It decreases if subjects cannot keep up with the increasing amount of possibilities 
open to them. The maximum obtainable payoff is an indicator of the opportunities that a 
group is able to build; the RNV measures to what extent these opportunities are seized by the 
subjects. 
Figure 2.4 shows the development of the maximum, minimum obtainable and actual 
payoffs over time by treatment. 
 
Figure 2.4. Evolution of minimum, maximum and actual payoffs by period and treatment 
 
Three remarkable facts are evident from the figure. First, as already noted in table 2.4 
above, the average value of subjects’ choices is higher in absence of IP. Second, the RNV is 
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words are created opening up more opportunities for subjects – is not matched by a similar 
increase in actual payoffs. Third, noIP treatments generate way more opportunities than IP 
treatments – as can be seen from the trajectory of the maximum achievable value (M) 
shooting off. The slope of M by period is significantly higher for noIP vs. IP treatments (the 
slope is 0.4165 for pooled noIP treatments, 0.3069 for pooled IP treatments, differently 
significant in an interacted regression, p<.000). This different success at creating 
opportunities is due to the fact that in noIP treatments more extensions are built, allowing the 
subjects to reach longer words and opening up a greater set of choices. 
In our experiment, in presence of IP some sequential innovations with a very high value for 
the whole group are not attainable at all or only with considerable delay. For instance, the 
most valuable attainable word reaches in treatment noChat/noIP a payoff of 10 by period 13, 
moving then to reach a maximum over 14. In the corresponding noChat/IP treatment, M is at 
6.4 by period 13 and it never reaches the value of 10. 
 
RESULT 4: In presence of IP very valuable sequential innovations are out of reach or 
achieved with delay only. Absence of IP pushes further the frontier of achievable innovations. 
2.3.3. Results and behavior determinants at the individual and group level 
We now turn to the individual and group level in order to test the robustness of our results and 
to identify the determinants of performance. 
Therefore, we run a simple OLS regression of the RNV on treatment conditions and a set 
of control variables. We introduce dummy variables for chat and IP treatments; their 
interaction identifies the chat/IP treatment. The baseline treatment for the regression is 
noChat/noIP. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ abilities in word 
creation, we include in the regression their performance in a control task that we designed for 
the purpose and was run before the experiment. Details of the task and its results can be found 
in appendix A. We include dummy variables for subjects in the upper and lower 25 percentile 
of the earned points distribution in the task, denoted as wordtask_high and wordtask_low. 
Furthermore age, female, proficiency in German (on a scale from 1 to 5) and period are 
included as explanatory variables. We interact period with the respective treatment condition, 
as we expect the RNV to decrease more strongly in absence of property rights (see figure 2.4). 
Individuals’ performance might crucially depend on the capabilities of the other group 
members. We therefore run the regression on the group level as well. In this case the most 
capable member of the group might determine the others’ performance as she might open up 
promising paths by building favorable roots and extensions. The exact opposite might be true 
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if there is a member with very low task-specific skills. This aspect is accounted for by 
redefining the dummy variables wordtask_high and wordtask_low, which in this case refer to 
the presence of at least one group member showing high or low performance in the control 
task. Results are summarized in table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5. Regression results – RNV 
  (individual level) (group level) 
      
chat -0.0325 -0.0419 
 
(0.0321) (0.0297) 
IP -0.0839** -0.0871*** 
 
(0.0346) (0.0297) 
chat_IP 0.0653 0.0794* 
 
(0.0534) (0.0420) 
period -0.0112*** -0.0118*** 
 
(0.00145) (0.00141) 
period_chat/IP -0.00135 -0.00179 
 
(0.00265) (0.00199) 
period_noChat/IP 0.000281 0.000601 
 
(0.00208) (0.00199) 
period_chat/noIP 0.000649 0.000862 
 
(0.00234) (0.00199) 
high in control task 0.0171 0.0145 
 
(0.0170) (0.0110) 















 Constant 0.673*** 0.552*** 
 
(0.0608) (0.0246) 
   Observations 4603 1200 
R-squared 0.070 0.216 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on the group level for the individual 
level regression.  
 
Estimated coefficients confirm our findings. Introducing IP decreases the created relative 
net value. A joint significance test for chat and chat_IP does not reject the Null of no 
influence (on the individual level F=0.81, p=.4502; on the group level F=1.8, p=.1662). Thus 
chat communication cannot prevent the negative effect of introducing intellectual property 
rights. As the game proceeds, created relative net value deteriorates as the marginal effect for 
period is significant, negative and quite strong. Recall that 25 periods were played, i.e. the 
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average RNV is estimated to almost halve from the first to very last period. This result 
confirms the developments shown in figure 2.4, although the interaction of period and IP is 
not significant, indicating that there is no significant difference in the downward trend 
between treatments. The indicator variables for the performance in the control task show the 
expected signs. On the individual level we find a significantly worse performance of subjects 
performing weakly in our control task. Females and older participants tend to perform worse, 
while the self-reported level of proficiency in German shows no significant influence. 
All in all, our results prove robust when controlling for the dynamics of the game, the 
actual choice set and participants characteristics at the individual and group level. 
The results of the RNV regressions shed light on another reason why IP leads to 
comparatively worse performance: in IP treatments subjects restrict attention to self-
originated words more than what optimal behavior would grant. In presence of license fees, 
optimality for the individual and for the group diverge. Roots and extensions of own words 
are more favorable as no license fee payments are induced. Thus, the observed systematic 
shift in behavior towards more roots and more self-originated words could reflect a rational, 
payoff-maximizing adjustment at the individual level. The RNV regressions show that this is 
not the case. In IP treatments subjects not only create less opportunities (lower maximum 
available payoff, see figure 2.4), but they also perform worse relative to these reduced 
opportunities, as clearly indicated by the strong and significant negative sign for IP in the 
RNV regressions. In IP treatments subjects overreact to the introduction of IP and forego 
substantial gains by trying to avoid license fee payments. As a consequence the total value 
created decreases even more than it could be expected when assuming fully rational behavior.  
 
RESULT 5: IP causes behavior to change even more drastically than it could be expected by 
assuming rational behavior. Subjects opt for lower net payments to avoid license fees. 
2.3.4. Dynamics of license fees 
In IP treatments subjects were able to choose the license fee between 0 and 100% of the value 
of their marginal contribution to the word. Figure 2.5 shows the average license fees chosen 
over periods for the IP treatments. Average fees tend to increase as the game proceeds.14 
Since the chosen fee can be interpreted as a measure of the level of cooperation within a 
group (cooperation increases as the fee demanded goes down), this finding resembles the 
                                                 
14 Although the result of increasing license fees is not generalizable as subjects knew the finite horizon of 
25 periods, it is an interesting finding which well connects to the findings in public goods experiments, see 
Ostrom (2000).  
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typical pattern of social interaction shown in many public good experiments (see, for instance, 
Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). In the first five periods, the average fee amounts to 0.59 
(0.49) in chat/IP (noChat/IP); it increases to 0.69 (0.63) in the last five periods. Overall, the 
presence of communication does not seem to avoid deteriorating cooperation levels; overall 
fee levels are not significantly different between chat/IP and noChat/IP (MWU-test z=0.924, 
p=.3556).15  
 
Figure 2.5. Average license fees over periods by treatment and within chat/IP 
  
 
We additionally distinguish groups that use chat communication to discuss license fee 
levels from those that do not.16 The former tend to be able to maintain lower fees over the 
course of the experiment. Communicating groups start off at low fees and are able to avoid a 
deterioration of cooperation. Observing group members that refrain from communication 
might be interpreted as a strong statement for the unwillingness to cooperate in general, which 
then leads to higher fees in comparison to treatments in which there is no opportunity to 
communicate in the first place. However, this difference within the chat/IP treatment might be 
due to self-selection. The difference cannot be held as evidence in support of a positive 
communication effect. 
Overall, we conclude that, but for a small subset of groups, chat communication is by and 
large not used to solve the collective action problem introduced by the presence of IP. We 
interpret this finding as lending additional support to RESULT 3: communication is not an 
                                                 
15 Please note that increasing license fees are not due to more extensions being built as the game proceeds. In 
fact, for both IP treatments license fees tend to be lower for extensions (chat/IP for the first half of the game 
m=0.61, sd=0.28 and for the second half m=0.65, sd=0.29; noChat/IP for the first half m=0.50, sd=0.20 and for 
the second half m=0.57, sd=0.24) in comparison to roots (chat/IP for the first half of the game m=0.66, sd=0.58 
and for the second half m=0.71, sd=0.29; noChat/IP for the first half m=0.58, sd=0.22 and for the second half 
m=0.65, sd=0.23). 
16 Note that out of 12 groups in chat/IP only 5 groups actually used chat communication and only 4 specifically 
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appropriate means to prevent the detrimental effect of intellectual property rights in our 
sequential innovation setting. 
The average level of license fees increases over time; nonetheless, the best predictor for the 
fee levels in the latter part of the experiment are fee levels in the first three periods. Figure 2.6 
shows a strong positive correlation of the average license fee in the first three and in the 
subsequent 22 periods. 
 
Figure 2.6. License fees path dependency 
 
 
Since average fees are increasing over time, there are some deviations toward the right 
hand side of the perfect correlation line. However, these deviations are rather modest. For 
chat/IP the correlation amounts to 0.9108 (p<.0000) and for noChat/IP correlation is 0.7663 
(p<.0000). This points to a higher share of groups that are able to agree upon a rather stable 
level of license fees by means of communication. If we further focus on the groups that use 
the chat to talk about fee levels, the correlation is (0.9739, compared to 0.7494 for non-
communicating groups). We confirm the finding that some groups are able to use 
communication to achieve fee stability at low levels. As above, we cannot ascribe for sure this 
result to communication in general, since self-selection is at play. The average level of license 
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RESULT 6: Cooperation as measured by license fees demanded proves path-dependent and 
tends to decrease over time; its level is determined by actions in the very first stages of the 
game. 
2.3.5. Importance of demanded license fees 
We showed that introducing IP reduces total welfare in our sequential innovation experiment. 
License fee levels serve as an indicator for cooperation that we found to be path dependent 
but by and large independent of the chat communication. However, actual license fee levels 
might explain variation in welfare created across groups, as one might expect groups agreeing 
upon low fees to perform in a similar way to the ones acting in absence of IP. Figure 2.7 plots, 
for each group, average fee levels against achieved welfare as measured by total net value. 
 
Figure 2.7. Average license fees and total net value RNV 
 
 
While there seems to be a weak negative correlation of fee levels and total net value when 
there is chat communication, this relationship is reversed without communication. Pooling 
together both IP treatments gives a correlation of average license fee and total value created 
























related with the group’s total output. We conclude that introducing an IP regime has a 
negative effect per se: the absolute levels of license fees are irrelevant. 
RESULT 7: Absolute levels of license fees are of no importance for the detrimental effect of 
an IP regime. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the debate on the role of intellectual property rights by means of a 
laboratory experiment. We recreate in the laboratory a sequential innovation environment, and 
use a word-creation task that combines the central features of innovation, investment and 
creativity, in one experiment. We use this task to investigate the effects of the presence or 
absence of intellectual property rights on innovation activity and welfare. We further assess 
the effect of communication with and without IP. 
Results clearly show that the introduction of intellectual property hinders innovation. In 
presence of IP the economy produces less valuable innovations, and welfare decreases. 
Introducing IP causes a shift towards more basic innovations and a higher degree of autarky – 
i.e., relying on the self-produced prior innovations rather than building on the best available 
opportunity within the economy at large. Conversely, the absence of IP results in more 
sophisticated and more valuable innovations and provides incentives to stand on the shoulders 
of giants, opening up more profitable innovation paths. Moreover, the negative effects of IP 
are not a short term phenomenon, but rather worsen over time as license fees tend to increase, 
leading to the breakdown of cooperative efforts and the use of autarkic strategies. 
These results are robust to the introduction of communication. The possibility to cooperate 
directly via chat, i.e. the possibility to negotiate a mutually beneficial level of license fees, is 
only seldom exploited, and if so, it does not lead to increased levels of innovation and 
welfare.  
Our experimental approach gives us distinct control over confounding factors, and 
produces clean causal evidence. At the same time, the validity of results from the lab for 
actual field conditions might be questioned. Therefore, we chose a task that included several 
features of real innovations – the sequential nature, the intrinsic plus the potential value of 
innovations, the role of creativity, knowledge, cooperation, competition, and skill, the 
presence of risky investments –, that were at the same time intuitive for subjects and 
completely controllable by the experimenters. To the extent that the characteristics of our task 
match the ones of actual innovation industries our results can be applied also outside the 
laboratory. 
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Our results suggest that in industries where innovations are strongly sequential – as in 
pharmaceutical, bioengineering, and software industries – granting intellectual property rights 
might slow down the rate of innovation and reduce welfare. Thus, our findings lend support to 
the arguments against the extension of intellectual property to new fields, especially if they 
are characterized by fast, frequent, small and cumulative innovations – as is the case of 
software patents. Our findings are in line with insights from the model of Bessen and Maskin 
(2009) and the case against IP made by Boldrin and Levine (2013). 
In our experiment both innovation and welfare thrive without IP, as it happened to several 
industries in the past, and are hampered by the presence of intellectual property rights, whose 
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Performance in the control task 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Before starting the experiment, we ran a control task to measure the subjects’ word-creation 
abilities, with the aim of creating a variable to control for skill heterogeneity in our regression 
analysis. The control task is built on Eckartz et al. (2012). All subjects are endowed with the 
same alphabetically ordered set of 12 letters (accehhikllst), and have 3 minutes to build as 
many words as possible, using only letters from the set. Each word earns the subject points. 
The value of the words created increases more than proportionally in length: a three-letter 
word yields 6 points, a four-letter words 10, a five-letter word 15, etc. In total, the given letter 
set allows to build 330 words, worth 5585 points.17 The task is incentivized by rewarding the 
performance of the best three subjects in each session with €1. Figure A2.1 gives an overview 
of the distribution of the groups’ performance across treatments as measured by points earned.  
 
Figure A2.1. Performance in the control task by group and treatment 
 
While there is some heterogeneity on the group level, differences equal out at the treatment 
level. Applying a Kruskal-Wallis test on the group level, we fail to reject the Null of equal 
performance across treatments (χ²=1.021 with df=3, p=.7962). Overall, our groups do not 
statistically differ in word-creation skills across treatments. Individuals’ differences in the 
control task are used to control for individual skills in the regressions of section 2.3.3.
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Note: We report here the English translation of the original German instructions for all 
treatments. The differences between treatments are indicated in square brackets. The original 





In this experiment, your task is to build words out of letters as in the board game “Scrabble”. 
By building words you increase your payoff: For each word you get a payoff calculated by the 
sum of the values of each letter. You start the game with an endowment of 4 letters. During 
the course of the game, you are able to buy additional letters. 
During the course of the game, you will play in a group of 4 players [chat treatments: with 




Your payoff depends on the sum of the value of your letters, which is calculated in 
experimental tokens. One token is converted to 0.12 Euro at the end of the experiment. You 
start the game with an endowment of 75 tokens. Note that it is possible to end the experiment 
with less than your starting endowment. 
 
Please note the table below containing all letters, their value (in tokens) and the frequency 
with which they occur in the game. During the game the letters are always displayed along 
with their value. 
 
Table A2.1. List of letters 
Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency 
A 1 10 J 6 2 S 1 14 
B 3 4 K 4 4 T 1 12 
C 4 4 L 2 6 U 1 12 
D 1 8 M 3 8 V 6 2 
E 1 30 N 1 18 W 3 2 
F 4 4 O 2 6 X 8 2 
G 2 6 P 4 2 Y 10 2 
H 2 8 Q 10 2 Z 3 2 
I 1 12 R 1 12    
 
On the next page you will find a screenshot of the main board of the game and some 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Course of a turn 
 
When it is your turn, a dialog pops up asking you for choices. During your turn you cannot 
use the spellchecker [chat treatments: and the chat]. You have 45 seconds for your decisions. 
You can see the remaining time on the top-left corner of the screen. If your time expires, you 
are subtracted 1 token for every additional 10 seconds from your endowment.  
Every turn consists of two phases [IP treatments: three phases]:  
 
1. Buying phase 
 
Your activity: Buying letters 
You can choose to buy or not to buy one letter at the price of 2 tokens. If you buy a letter, 
it will be chosen randomly from the list of letters shown on table A2.1. At the beginning 
you are given four letters for free. Each letter can only be used once: After producing or 
extending a word the letter will be deleted from your letter set.  
 
2. Word phase 
 
Your activity: Producing or extending words 
You can use German words, their conjugations and declinations and some names of places 
and persons. You can test if a word is correct using the spellchecker when it is not your 
turn. Correct words can be built as follows: 
 
Option 1:  Producing a 3-letter word 
 
a) You can produce a word using exactly three of your letters. The payoff that you 
earn for creating a word is given by the sum of the value of the letters (Example: 
‚pol‘: p = 4, o = 2, l = 2. This results in 4+2+2 = 8 tokens). 
 
To create a word, you will have to type in the letters with your keyboard. 
Please note that you cannot undo mistakes: if you make an error while inputting 
the word (i.e. inputting a too long, too short, nonexistent or misspelled word, or 
pressing the enter key on an empty field) the turn passes to the next player. You 
will have the opportunity to reiterate your entry correctly only in the next period, 
during your next turn. 
 
Option 2:   Extending a word 
 
b) You can extend an existing word inserting one letter in any position in the word. 
For example ‘ast’ can be extended into ‘last’, ‘rast’ and ‘aste’, and ‘last’ again into 
‘laust’ and this into ‘klaust’. It is not possible to rearrange existing words (e.g. to 
build from ‘ast’ the word ‘Star’).  
Your payoff results from the sum of the value of the letters of the newly-extended 
word. By extending e.g. ‘last’ into ‘laust’ you get l = 2, a = 1, u = 1, s = 1, t = 1, so 
2+1+1+1+1 = 6 tokens. Every word can only be produced once but can 
subsequently be used for as many extensions as possible. 
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Option 3:   Passing 
 
c) In case you are not able to produce nor to extend any word, you can pass the turn 
to the next player. 
 
3. License phase [IP treatments only] 
 
Your activity: Setting a license fee 
After producing a word you have to set a license fee which other players are required to pay 
when creating extensions. The fee must be set between 0 and 100 percent of the value of the 
word. 
 
Figure A2.2. Intellectual property choice 
 
 
If another player extends your word, he automatically transfers the fee to you. 
 
- 0 percent means that the word is entirely free for other players. 
- At 100 percent, the next player only receives the value of his added letter.  
- The choice of 20 percent means that the respective player has to pay 20 percent of the 
value of the word to you. 
 
The license fee for a word remains fixed during the entire game. The word appears on the list 
of public words on the main board and can be used by everyone. However, other players have 
to pay the license fee when extending the word. 
Furthermore, you will have to set a license fee if you extend a word with one letter. In this 
case, you decide on the fee only for your added letter. Your payoff results from the sum of the 
value of all letters minus the license fee for the word you built on. 
 
After that, your turn ends and it is the next player’s turn. The game is played for 25 periods.  
Finally, for clarification, some payoff-examples are offered: 
 
Examples for potential payoffs [IP treatments]: 
 
Example 1: If player 1 sets a license fee of 90 percent for the word ‘ast’ (value of the word 3 
tokens: a = 1, s = 1, t = 1) and player 2 extends the word into ‘hast’ (value of h = 2), this 
results in the following payoffs: 
Player 1: 90 percent of 3 tokens = 2.7 tokens (license fee for player 1) 
Player 2: 3 – 2.7 tokens (to player 1) + 2 tokens for the letter ‘h’ = 0.3 tokens + 2 tokens = 2.3 
tokens 
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Example 2: If player 1 sets the license fee of 0 percent for ‘ast’, player 2 receives the sum of 
the value of all letters for extending it into ‘hast’: 
Player 1: 0 percent of 3 tokens = 0 token 
Player 2: 100 percent of 5 tokens = 5 tokens 
 
Example 3: After extending a word, the player has to set a license fee for the added letter. 
Player 1 sets a license fee of 10 percent for ‘ast’and player 2 sets a license fee of 50 percent 
for the letter ‘h’ in ‘hast’. If player 3 then extends ‘hast’ into ‘haust’, this results in the 
following payoffs:  
Player 1: 10 percent of 3 tokens = 0.3 (license fee for player 1) 
Player 2: 50 percent of 2 tokens = 1 (license fee for player 2)  
Player 3: 6 tokens for ‚haust‘ – 0.3 tokens (to player 1) – 1 token (to player 2) = 4.7 tokens 
 
Examples for potential payoffs [no-IP treatments]: 
 
Example 1: Player 1 produces the word ‘ast’. The values of the letters are a = 1 token, s = 1 
token, t = 1 token. Therefore, he gets 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 tokens for his word. 
 
Example 2: If player 2 extends ‘ast’ into ‘hast’, he will get 5 tokens, as all values of letters of 







Instructions for the control task 
 
Note: The instructions for the word task were shown on screen. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
In the next screen you will see a string composed of 9 letters. 
You will be asked to create as many German words as possible using these letters within 3 
minutes. 
You can type the words you create in the field beneath the string of 9 letters, and you submit 
them by hitting Enter.  
You can use each letter only once per word and a word cannot be shorter than 3 letters.  
Longer words generate more points. 
3-letter word: 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 points 
4-letter word: 4+ 3 + 2 + 1 = 10 points 
etc. 
After the 3 minutes will have expired, the test will end and you will be shown your results. 
As soon as you enter the next screen, the timer will start ticking. 




































Economic research on innovation has long discussed which policy instruments best foster 
innovativeness in individuals and organizations. One of the instruments easily accessible to 
policy-makers is innovation contests; however, there is ambiguous empirical evidence 
concerning how such contests should be designed. Our experimental study provides evidence 
by analyzing the effects of two different innovation contests on subjects’ innovativeness: a 
prize for the aggregate innovativeness and a prize for the best innovation. We implement a 
creative real effort task simulating a sequential innovation process, whereby subjects 
determine royalty fees for their created products, which also serve as a measure of 
cooperation. We find that both contest conditions reduce the willingness to cooperate between 
subjects compared to a benchmark condition without an innovation contest. However, the 
total innovation activity is not influenced by introducing innovation contest schemes. From a 
policy perspective, the implementation of state-subsidized innovation contests in addition to 













Innovations are considered the driving force for economic growth in modern economies, 
prompting governments to stimulate private and public innovation activities. Most recently, 
the European Union announced increasing investment in R&D to three percent of GDP by 
2020 and – in a similar effort – the United States legislated the “America COMPETES 
Reauthorization Act” to improve their competitiveness by boosting R&D (COM (2010) 2020; 
H.R.5116). Policy-makers can draw upon three categories of instruments to implement such 
strategies: regulatory instruments such as intellectual property rights, economic and financial 
regulations such as subsidies or tax exemptions and soft instruments such as voluntary 
agreements (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998; Borrás and Edquist 2013). The determination of 
states to increase domestic innovativeness has initiated a large research debate, discussing 
how to best combine these instruments to achieve an effective policy mix (Flanagan et al. 
2011; Guerzoni and Raiteri 2015).18 
Innovation contests are one of the most frequently discussed financial regulatory 
instruments, commonly modeled as a competitive game with one or more players investing to 
create innovations (Kremer and Williams 2010; Adler 2011; Clancy and Moschini 2013).19 
Economic research has analyzed innovation contests with respect to design specifics and their 
potential outcome by considering e.g. single or multiple solvers and prizes, its duration and – 
most prominently – its incentive structure (Adamczyk et al. 2012; Williams 2012). The 
distinct design of incentive structures analyzed comprise e.g. ex-post prizes rewarding 
previous work (Moser and Nicholas 2013) or ex-ante prizes with unknown outcome (Murray 
et al. 2012), as well as proportional prize contests, whereby the prize is granted relative to 
participants’ achievements (Cason et al. 2010).  
Numerous theoretical and empirical contributions have aimed at deriving policy 
implications for the most efficient design of innovation contests. However, empirical research 
shows ambiguous findings concerning the impact of innovation contests (Boudreau et al. 
2011; Brunt et al. 2012; Nicholas 2013). Similarly, there are mixed results developed in 
theoretical contributions (Wright 1983; Taylor 1995; Moldovanu and Sela 2001; Che and 
Gale 2003; Ganuza and Hauk 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Schöttner 2008; Chari et al. 2012). We 
contribute to this unresolved debate by presenting novel empirical evidence from a laboratory 
experiment and derive policy implications for the optimal design of innovation contests.  
                                                 
18 For a broader literature overview regarding the effect of public subsidies on innovativeness, see Zúñiga-
Vicente et al. (2014) and David et al. (2000); a similar study on the effect of taxes is provided by Hall and van 
Reenen (2000). For an overview of the necessity of subsidizing innovations from a financial market perspective, 
see Hall and Lerner (2010). 
19 See Williams (2012) and Adamczyk et al. (2012) for a review on the current literature on innovation contests. 
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We follow an experimental approach to overcome some shortcomings of previous research 
in evaluating the effects of various contest schemes on innovativeness. Empirical research 
relying on field data is bound to data availability and thus a profound analysis across contest 
schemes is not feasible. Economic experiments allow generating data that enables a ceteris 
paribus comparison of different contest schemes (Blasio et al. 2014). Therefore, we would 
argue along with Sørensen et al. (2010) that economic experiments are “a promising 
approach” (Sørensen et al. 2010, 313) and a fruitful methodological addition to the existing 
innovation research.  
Based upon this notion, experimental studies can analyze the effects of different policy 
instruments e.g. by simulating sequential innovation processes (Cantner et al. 2009; Meloso et 
al. 2009; Buchanan and Wilson 2014). Dealing with innovation in laboratory experiments 
necessarily induces a trade-off between simulating the complex interactions of creative and 
dynamic sequential innovation processes accurately and keeping the task manageable for 
participants. While this obviously places certain limits upon the external validity of an 
experimental approach, we are confident that we are able to achieve a meaningful analysis of 
innovation contests in our setting, given that we implement the key features of actual 
innovation settings like risky investment choices and creativity. Therefore, we build upon a 
prior setting, investigating the effects of introducing intellectual property rights for 
innovations, whereby subjects are rewarded for their innovativeness and are able to license 
their innovations by demanding royalty fees (Crosetto 2010; Brüggemann et al. 2015).  
However, in our analysis, we focus on two specific types of innovation contests, 
implementing (1) a prize for the aggregate innovativeness and (2) a prize for the best 
innovation. According to a between-subject design, the two treatments are subsequently 
compared to (3) a benchmark treatment without an innovation contest. All treatments include 
the possibility to license innovations that allow measuring cooperation behavior and only 
differ with respect to the payment structure. Particularly for investigating the effects of a prize 
for the aggregate innovativeness, we implement a contest with a relative payoff-scheme 
disproportionally rewarding the most innovative subject. In the treatment with the prize for 
the best innovation, subjects are paid proportionally for each innovation while an additional 
bonus is awarded to the subject who has created the most valuable innovation. In the 
benchmark treatment, subjects are merely paid proportionally to their innovations. This 
experimental set-up allows us to test for the specific effects of introducing innovation contests 
on individual creativity and innovation performance, as well as concerning how cooperation 
among innovators evolves with and without contest schemes. 
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We find that both types of innovation contests – the prize for the aggregate innovativeness 
and the prize for the best innovation – reduce the willingness to cooperate as measured by the 
average royalty fees demanded. However, the actual cooperation does not decrease, as 
subjects tend to accept the higher royalty fees to build upon other subjects’ previous 
innovations to win the innovation contest. With respect to innovativeness, our results indicate 
that neither a prize for the aggregate innovativeness nor a prize for the best innovation have a 
positive overall impact. Therefore, our behavioral evidence suggests that both types of 
contests investigated cannot unambiguously be recommended as effective policy instruments 
due to welfare concerns. This becomes apparent when considering potential distortions to 
generate the revenue to spend on innovation contests and diminished cooperation among 
innovators. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature, before section 3.3 outlines our experimental design and hypotheses. Section 3.4 
presents our results and section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Literature Review 
There is a large body of literature dealing with the effects of innovation contests. Williams 
(2012) reviews this literature with a focus on innovation prizes in the United States, 
emphasizing the importance of both estimating an appropriate size of prizes and considering 
the sequentiality of innovations for spurring subsequent innovations. Williams claims that 
additional research on the effectiveness of prizes and the specific construction of prize designs 
is required. Adamczyk et al. (2012) review the current literature on innovation contests by 
drawing upon the distinct perspectives from economic, management, education, innovation 
and sustainability research. From an economic research perspective, they point out that more 
innovators will participate in contests if there is a high monetary award. Similar to Williams 
(2012), they suggest that further research should focus on the particular design of innovation 
contests. Clancy and Moschini (2013) provide an overview of different financial regulation 
instruments to foster innovation. They state that innovation contests can potentially overcome 
deadweight losses caused through the monopoly rights of patents and moral hazard problems 
of contracted research. Comparing the different instruments, they claim that a hybrid system 
in which innovators can choose to receive either a patent or a prize is superior to a pure patent 
system in terms of output.20  
                                                 
20 For further reviews on innovation prizes, see Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2004). 
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A number of theoretical studies consider the optimal design of innovation contests, 
yielding ambiguous implications. Taylor (1995) models innovation contests with 
homogeneous contestants, showing that restricting the entry may be beneficial for the contest 
designer. Wright (1983) investigates patents, prizes and contracts as rewards for winning 
innovation contests, finding advantages of patents over prizes due to private information. 
Comparing a contest comprising multiple prizes with a contest offering a single prize, 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) find that the latter leads to an optimal allocation of resources. 
Ganuza and Hauk (2006) study vertical and horizontal competition in contests, finding 
multiple equilibria. Cohen et al. (2008) analyze the design of innovation contests and their 
potential of maximizing either the overall or the maximum effort, finding that the optimal 
prize can both increase and decrease participants’ effort. Comparing a first-price auction with 
a fixed-prize tournament in innovation contests, Schöttner (2008) suggests that the latter is 
superior. 
Furthermore, there are some empirical studies on the effects of specific innovation prizes, 
which also show mixed evidence. Murray et al. (2012) investigate the ex-ante influence of the 
Progressive Automotive Insurance X PRIZE as an example of a grand innovation prize. 
Boudreau et al. (2011) analyze the results of a computer programming contest with respect to 
the size of the participant pool on individual effort levels. If more competitors are permitted, 
the aggregate innovativeness will decrease, while the probability of a high valued innovation 
increases. Nicholas (2013) examines the effectiveness of innovation prizes in Japan’s Meiji 
era, finding strong evidence that prizes lead to a substantial boost of new patents. Relying on 
a similar approach, Brunt et al. (2012) estimate a substantial increase in patenting activities in 
the Royal Agricultural Society of England between 1839 and 1939 due to innovation prizes. 
Another methodological approach to empirically investigate innovation prizes is to conduct 
economic experiments.21 There are few studies relying on a search task to imitate the 
innovation process. In a field experiment, Boudreau and Lakhani (2012) discover the impact 
of different types of innovation prizes by allowing subjects to choose between competitive 
and cooperative regimes. In comparison to a benchmark treatment, the problem-solving 
performance almost doubled in the competitive regime and increased by one-third in the 
                                                 
21 A large body of experimental research deals with the question of the best incentive structure in contests 
focusing on investment and organizational structures, while excluding the innovative part of the process. For an 
overview on winner-takes-it-all and rank-order tournaments with fixed prizes, see Irlenbusch (2006). Fullerton et 
al. (1999) test the predictions of Taylor’s search model of tournaments, finding that R&D contests achieve very 
high levels of efficiency in the laboratory and that the level of research effort tends to be close to the theoretical 
predictions. Comparing a winner-takes-it-all-contest with a proportional-payment design, Cason et al. (2010) 
find more entries and higher total achievement in the proportional-payment scheme, as a single very capable 
player often dejects other participants in the winner-takes-it-all scheme. 
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cooperative regime when subjects could choose their preferred institutional setting. Using a 
word task, Eckartz et al. (2012) identify only very small effects of different payment schemes, 
given that subjects were intrinsically motivated by the self-rewarding task. Furthermore, 
analyzing exploration behavior and risk aversion under different payment schemes, Ederer 
and Manso (2013) present a searching task in a multi-dimensional space. They find that a 
combination of tolerance for early failure and rewards for long-term success are effective in 
fostering innovation. Buchanan and Wilson (2014) use a search task similar to Ederer and 
Manso (2013) to simulate intellectual property and additionally provide subjects with the 
option to produce a non-creative good. When intellectual property is available to subjects, the 
creation of non-rivalrous innovation knowledge goods is greatest. However, prices increase as 
substantial monopoly profits are acquired by the innovators. In the absence of intellectual 
property rights, subjects still create non-rivalrous innovations, although they also resort to 
intellectual property theft from other subjects. Rijnsoever et al. (2012) examine the influence 
of an environmental change on innovative behavior, whereby subjects have to make a risky 
investment decision over several periods to achieve a second stage with a prize contest and 
environmental change. In a second study, the measure of innovative behavior was transferred 
to a business context. The authors find support for a U-shaped relationship between economic 
status and innovative behavior in both cases. 
By choosing to implement non-creative real effort search tasks, the experiments reviewed 
above tend to exclude the creativity required in an innovation process. However, transferring 
this immanent feature of the innovation process to the lab might be crucial to achieve 
meaningful results at a satisfactory level of external validity. Only few papers implement 
creativity tasks to more closely simulate innovation processes to examine the influence of 
incentive structures on innovativeness. Bradler (2015) compares the incentives of a 
tournament with a fixed payment scheme for a creative task, finding support for self-selection 
into tournaments according to risk attitudes and self-assessments, yet no such effect for 
creative productivity. Crosetto (2010) presents experimental evidence on innovation behavior 
in the presence of intellectual property rights, including open source. The author introduces a 
real effort word creation task in which subjects – similar to the board game Scrabble – 
innovate by creating and extending words. Crosetto’s results suggest that open source only 
emerges in treatments with high royalty fees rather than low ones, although high royalty fees 
tend to foster anticommons effects. Building upon this study and introducing endogenous 
license fees, Brüggemann et al. (2015) show that overall innovativeness increases in a setting 
without intellectual property rights. 
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We contribute to the literature reviewed above by implementing such a real effort word 
creation task to research into the effects of introducing varying incentive schemes for 
innovations. In particular, we are interested in two types of innovation contests: (1) a prize for 
the aggregate innovativeness and (2) a prize for the best innovation.  
3.3. Experimental Design 
3.3.1. Design 
Many features determine the outcomes of an innovation contest, e.g. the available information 
and the number of participants. However, in our study, we concentrate on one crucial feature, 
namely the external incentive scheme designed by public policy-makers to foster 
innovativeness and eventually cooperation among competitors. Our basic framework 
implements a real effort word creation task, representing a sequential innovation setting with 
the possibility to license innovations. This basic framework is based upon Crosetto (2010) and 
Brüggemann et al. (2015) and is modified to test for the effects of a prize for the aggregate 
innovativeness and a prize for the best innovation.  
To implement task characteristics like creativity and to account for the subjects’ different 
skills, we recreate the board game Scrabble for our laboratory experiment. Therefore, subjects 
can earn a certain payoff by creating words from letters, which they can buy from the 
experimenter. They have the option to determine license fees for produced words, which can 
be extended in the following, thus representing the sequentiality of the innovation process. 
Thus, subjects have to act strategically and creatively by facing both an investment decision 
(buying new letters) as well as the real effort task of building words from randomly assigned 
letters. The game is played by groups of 4 randomly matched subjects. The group 
composition remains constant throughout the 25 periods of the game. The initial endowment 
for each subject comprises 75 experimental tokens and 4 randomly pre-selected letters.22  
In all treatments, subjects can take three actions upon each turn: first, deciding to invest by 
buying a letter; second, producing a word; and third, choosing a royalty fee. 
 
Investment phase 
Initially, a subject has to decide whether to buy a random letter for a fixed price of 2 tokens. 
The letter set comprises 191 letters, whose valuation is determined by the inverse of a letter’s 
frequency in the set, leading to an average letter value of 1.87. Therefore, buying a letter 
                                                 
22 The English translation of the original German experimental instructions is provided in appendix A, including 
a screenshot of the main board and the details of the letterset. 
62 
potentially leads to negative returns, as a letter’s price is somewhat above its average value. 
The letters are allocated randomly to the subjects, although the sequence of letters given out is 
predetermined and fixed for all groups, which makes the action sets across groups more 
comparable.  
 
Production phase  
Following the investment phase, the respective subject chooses to produce a three-letter word 
(root), extend an existing word (extension) or pass and do nothing in the respective period. 
When building an extension, a subject is only allowed to extend an existing word with one 
additional letter, which can be placed in any position of the existing word. For instance, if a 
subject owns the letters a, d, i and p, she can create the roots aid or dip.23 For example, aid 
can be extended to paid, maid or arid, while arid can then be extended into acrid and so on. 
All produced words yield a payoff equal to the sum of the letter values, although a word can 
only be produced once. Accordingly, longer words tend to be more valuable. When extending 
a word, not only the one letter added but rather all letters of the new word generate payoff. 
For instance, extending arid (worth 1+1+1+1=4 tokens) into acrid with the letter c – which 
itself is worth 4 tokens – results in a payoff of 8 tokens. 
 
Royalty phase 
After having created a root or an extension, each subject is able to determine a royalty fee. A 
royalty fee for an extension only refers to the one letter added. Royalty fees range from 0% to 
100% in steps of 10%. The chosen royalty fee becomes public information and is fixed for the 
rest of the game. However, no one can be excluded from using the word altogether. By 
choosing higher royalty fees, subjects earn more when their word creations are extended by 
other subjects. Nevertheless, at the group level, royalty fees are merely a mechanism of 
redistributing income as there are no transaction costs.  
For example, subject A produces aid – worth 3 tokens – and chooses a royalty fee of 40%. 
Every subject who extends aid pays A 1.2 tokens. Consider subject B extending aid into paid, 
which is worth 7 tokens: 1.2 tokens are transferred to subject A, subject B earns 5.8 tokens 
and has to set a royalty fee for the letter p, worth 4 tokens. If she chooses 50%, the next 
subject adding a letter to the word paid will have to pay 1.2 tokens to subject A and 2 tokens 
(50% of 4 tokens, namely the value of the letter p) to subject B. In order to keep the decision 
                                                 
23 For an easier understanding, we report the following examples in English, although the experiment was run in 
German. 
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for subjects simple, the amount of royalty fees incurred by using a word is always presented 
to subjects on the main board (see appendix A). 
When subjects are not at turn, the main board of the game is shown. On this board, subjects 
are shown their payoffs so far, they can observe the actions of their group members and are 
able to come up with their next word creations using the list of extendable public words, their 
own letters and testing new creations with an interactive spellchecker. The spellchecker can 
be used without restriction to check whether a word is accepted in the game. A word is 
accepted when it is included in the MS Windows dictionary implemented in the game. The 
list of public words comprises all words produced in the respective group thus far. 
Furthermore, the information on the value of these public words, the respective amount of 
royalty fees and the respective owner of the word is documented. 
3.3.2. Treatment conditions and experimental procedure 
We implement a between-subject design with three treatments, as shown in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Overview of the treatment conditions 
treatment Variation number of participants 
 prize for the aggregate innovativeness 
prize for the best 
innovation  
control no no 48 
ranking yes no 48 
bonus no yes 48 
 
In control, accumulated tokens are converted by an exchange rate of 1 token to €0.12 at the 
end of the game.24 In ranking, subjects are paid relative to the performance of the other group 
members and receive a prize for their aggregate innovativeness. The subject who has 
accumulated the most tokens at the end of the game receives €24, while the other three group 
members receive a show-up fee of €12 each.25 Accordingly, in ranking, an additional box 
showing the current ranking is displayed on the main board, which allows subjects to 
constantly evaluate their performance. In bonus, the payoff is the same as in control, aside 
                                                 
24 Please note that we used the data of the treatment noChat/IP from Brüggemann et al. (2015) as our control 
treatment. Both experiments have been conducted in the same laboratory and the recruitment of subjects was 
from the same pool of student participants; however, no subject was allowed to participate in both experiments.  
25 In case two or more players had the same number of tokens and all were ranked first, each player would have 
received €24. Therefore, it would have been possible for all players to do nothing and receive €24; however, this 
did not occur. 
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from a €10 bonus awarded to the subject building the most valuable word and thus for the best 
innovation. Precisely, this means that the subject adding the last letter to the word with the 
highest value receives an additional €10.26 Similar to ranking, an additional box on the main 
board displays a list of all subjects’ current most valuable words. To provide an additional 
control variable for individual creativity, we implemented an incentivized word-finding 
control task before starting the main task.27 
Experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Behavioral Economics at the University 
of Göttingen. Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and were allowed to 
participate in one session only, which lasted around 90 minutes. The 13 sessions for control 
took place in August and September 2013. In February, March and April 2014, we conducted 
the sessions for ranking and bonus with 144 subjects in total. To successfully participate in 
the experiment, subjects necessarily have to speak German well. Therefore, we carried out the 
same language test as Kirchkamp and Reiß (2011), thus essentially excluding non-native 
speakers.28 Participants were on average 23.7 years old and 48.6% were female, with 37.5% 
being students of economics. On average, each participant earned €16 in sessions lasting 
around 90 minutes, with a minimum payoff of €5.9 and a maximum of €32.4. 
3.3.3. Hypotheses 
Overall innovativeness – which we define as the aggregate value created in the game by 
building words – will decline over the course of the game if subjects merely build roots due to 
the lower expected value of a letter (1.87 tokens) when compared to its cost (2 tokens). Thus 
overall innovativeness only increases when subjects build extensions and re-use existing 
words. Therefore, cooperation among participants – i.e. the tendency to make use of others’ 
innovations, as well as not trying to exclude others from one’s own innovations – might be 
crucial for aggregate welfare.  
Our first hypothesis applies two different measures of cooperation: the demanded royalty 
fees and the extensions created from other subjects’ roots. Subjects demanding low royalty 
fees for their roots foster the production of additional extensions. This can be interpreted as 
willingness to cooperate, which may increase groups’ overall innovativeness. However, at an 
individual level, it might be reasonable to set high royalty fees to generate additional income 
from creating innovations. In turn, at the group level, this might have a detrimental effect as 
                                                 
26 In case two players achieve the same highest value – which did not occur in any case – both would have been 
rewarded the bonus. 
27 The instructions for the word task can be found in appendix B, the results in appendix C.  
28 The participants had to find the correct word or form to complete a sentence. Those who failed the language 
test on more than two out of 10 items were not allowed to participate. 
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subjects could cease using other subjects’ words to avoid paying royalty fees and to build 
more roots. These considerations emphasize the game’s inherent social dilemma character in 
the presence of royalty fees, which might affect overall innovativeness, i.e. the ratio of basic 
(roots) and more sophisticated innovations (extensions). 
Therefore, we interpret the level of royalty fees chosen by subjects as the willingness to 
cooperate, whereas the number of extensions of other subjects’ words can be understood as 
the level of actual cooperation. The willingness to cooperate shows potentially adverse effects 
of the competition framework implemented in ranking and bonus. Previous findings in both 
the innovation contest and the experimental literature point to decreasing cooperation due to 
competitive settings (Boudreau et al. 2011; Chaudhuri 2011). We thus assume increased 
competition with a prize for the aggregate innovativeness (ranking) and a prize for the best 
innovation (bonus) to lower the willingness to cooperate, as measured by higher royalty fees 
demanded. Furthermore, we expect a decrease in actual cooperation measured by the 
frequency of using other subjects’ words in both innovation contests, namely ranking and 
bonus.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (“Competition and cooperation”)  
a) The willingness to cooperate is lower in ranking and bonus. 
b) The actual cooperation is lower in ranking and bonus. 
 
Our second hypothesis addresses the effect of contest schemes on innovativeness. There is 
no clear consensus within the innovation literature regarding which design of an innovation 
contest best fosters innovativeness (Williams 2012). However, based upon previous studies 
pointing to rather positive effects of innovation contests on innovativeness (Brunt et al. 2012; 
Nicholas 2013), we hypothesize that the total innovation activity will increase given a contest 
scheme. Accordingly, we formulate the following:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (“Innovation activity”)  
Total innovation activity increases in ranking and bonus. 
3.4. Results 
We first analyze the effects of introducing an innovation contest on the willingness to 
cooperate and actual cooperation, before subsequently investigating overall innovativeness. 
We finally check the robustness of our results against the actual choice set by introducing a 
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measure providing the degree to which individuals were able to exploit their specific 
opportunities of producing words in each period.29 
3.4.1. Competition and cooperation 
3.4.1.1. Willingness to cooperate 
For all treatments, the game allows subjects to license their innovations by demanding royalty 
fees between 0% and 100%. Royalty fees can be interpreted as a measure of cooperation as 
they give the prices for building upon others’ prior innovations. Subjects who are reluctant to 
cooperate will ask for higher royalty fees, while those interested in cooperation choose lower 
fees and might expect some reciprocal behavior. Remember that letters induce costs when 
they are bought but can be reused several times, which generates an income premium for 
cooperation, i.e. a surplus at the group level. Put simply, at lower royalty fees, subjects might 
be more willing to build upon the same words several times and thus create more 
sophisticated innovations, which benefits the whole group. Figure 3.1 illustrates the average 
royalty fees demanded by treatment. 
 
Figure 3.1. Royalty fees demanded by treatment 
 
                                                 
29 Note that we can rule out the notion that treatment differences are driven by a particular distribution of task 
specific knowledge due to the results of our control task (appendix C). 
mean (control) =.55
mean (ranking)=.74

























For all treatments, there is an upward trend in royalty fees demanded, which connects well 
to the findings of the public good experiment literature, typically identifying decreasing 
cooperation over time (Chaudhuri 2011). However, royalty fees demanded are lowest in 
control (Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) test for control vs. ranking z=-2.136 and p=.0327; for 
control vs. bonus z=-2.194 and p=.0282)30, whereby the difference amounts to about 20 
percentage points and is constant over time.  
 
RESULT 1: There is strong evidence in support of H1a. While the royalty fees demanded 
gradually increase over time for all payment schemes, there is a substantial downward shift 
in the willingness to cooperate when introducing innovation contests. 
3.4.1.2. Actual cooperation 
Recall that royalty payments are merely a matter of redistributing income; thus, the shift in 
royalty fees demanded does not necessarily reduce innovation activity or welfare. By contrast, 
higher royalty fees might stimulate innovation activity as produced words generate additional 
income when used by others. Conversely, less cooperation might lead to more basic and less 
sophisticated innovation activity as subjects might want to circumvent royalty fees, whereby 
revenues of reusing inputs (letters) are thus foregone. In the following, we investigate the 
relevance of these two contradicting views, which refer to Hypotheses 1b, i.e. whether the 
actual cooperation is lower in the contest treatments. 
We can measure whether the higher royalty fees demanded in ranking and bonus transfer 
to a less cooperative innovation process by considering figure 3.2, which details the share of 
extensions of other subjects’ roots plotted against the level of royalty fees demanded.  
The figure again shows the overall higher level of royalty fees demanded in ranking and 
bonus. We can now answer the question of whether the unwillingness to cooperate merely 
increases the price of cooperation or if cooperation itself is decreasing. Although the share of 
others’ words extensions tends to be higher for control with mean=0.69 and sd=0.07, the 
difference fails to be significant for ranking with mean=0.64 and sd=0.09 (MWU-test z=-
1.447, p=.1479) and bonus with mean=0.66 and sd=0.11 (z=-0.636, p=.525). 
  
                                                 
30 Unless indicated otherwise, all tests are performed at the group level, i.e. each group gives one independent 
observation only. 
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Figure 3.2. Share of extensions of others’ roots and royalty fees by group 
 
 
RESULT 2: While the willingness to cooperate is lower for a competitive payment scheme in 
innovation contests (H1a), the actual cooperation as measured by the tendency to use others’ 
prior innovations is not significantly lower (H1b). 
3.4.2. Innovation activity 
3.4.2.1. Total innovation activity 
Aggregate income for groups is given by the total value of the produced words minus costs 
for the letters bought, denominated in the following as total net value. An individual’s income 
is defined as the aggregate value of the produced words minus the royalty fees paid and the 
costs for the letters bought.  
To assess innovation activity, we distinguish between basic and more sophisticated 
innovations. Extensions always build upon prior roots and potentially prior extensions. As 
explained above, using letters several times is beneficial as the letters only have to be paid 
once. The ratio of extensions to roots crucially influences total innovativeness as sunk costs 
for the letter endowment within a group become less relevant the more extensions are created. 
This ratio is also reflected in the average word length and the average word value within 
































Table 3.2. Overview of words and value created by treatment 
  control ranking bonus 










 median 210 197 205.5 
 min 103 142 74 
 max 274 299 281 































Almost all key figures indicate similar results across treatments.31 The maximum word 
value achieved is significantly higher in bonus when compared to control (MWU-test for 
control vs. bonus z=-2.278 and p=.0228). Figure 3.3 illustrates the distribution of the total net 
value across treatments in further detail. Again, there are no substantial differences. 
  
                                                 
31 Applying a Mann-Whitney-U test at the group level does not indicate any significant differences between 
control and bonus or control and ranking.  
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Figure 3.3. Value of words produced within ranked groups by treatment 
 
 
RESULT 3: We find no support for H2, given that there are no significant differences in the 
total innovation activity regardless of the innovation contest. Nevertheless, the most 
sophisticated innovation is significantly more valuable when there is a prize for the best 
innovation.  
3.4.2.2. Controlling for the actual choice set 
In this section, we control for the actual choice set to check the robustness of our results 
presented in the previous section. As the game is characterized by path dependency given by 
the extendibility of words produced early in the game, differences across treatments and 
groups might be driven by the actual choice set available. We aimed at minimizing the 
importance of this aspect by endowing each group with the same letter set, although each 
action in the game still determines the choice set for future innovations due to the game’s 
sequentiality. Nonetheless, the sequentiality and uncertainty in terms of path dependency are 
essential characteristics of the innovation process and thus have to be incorporated into a 
well-designed innovation experiment.  
We draw upon a reduced – or rather myopic – approach of rationality, given that it is not 
expected that subjects are able to calculate the optimal choice with respect to the whole 25 






















might choose optimally in terms of the opportunities in the current period. Therefore, we 
calculate the relative net value (RNV) (Brüggemann et al. 2015). Let Cit denote the actual 
choice set for subject i in a specific period t, determined by the available letters and the words 
already produced. The payoff in each period π(cit) is a function of the actual choice taken 
citϵCit and equals the aggregate value of the letters used minus the paid royalty fees and the 
cost for letters. The maximum payoff is defined as Mit=max{π(cit),citϵCit} and the minimum 
is defined as mit={π(cit),citϵCit}. The relative net value RNVit is subsequently given by: 
RNVit=(πit-mit)/(Mit-mit) 
Since the payoff for the actual choice is always within the boundaries of the minimum and 
maximum payoff, it holds that RNVit ϵ[0,1], m≤0, M≥0 and m≤c≤ M. Accordingly, a higher 
RNV is associated with higher payoffs. We can thus capture path dependency by identifying 
superior actions conditional upon the actual choice set. The RNV serves as a perfect linear 
transformation of actual payoffs.32 In contrast to the aggregate created value, the RNV might 
decrease over periods, in which case subjects fail to take advantage of upcoming opportunities 
given by new word creations. However, the RNV increases when subjects learn to better 
exploit innovation opportunities. Table 3.3 summarizes the RNV by treatments. 
 
Table 3.3. Relative Net Value across treatments. Summary statistics 
 RNV 
 average (sd) Median min max 
control 0.317 (0.0309) 0.311 0.274 0.378 
ranking 0.328 (0.0366) 0.329 0.272 0.372 
bonus 0.375 (0.049) 0.375 0.294 0.451 
 
In contrast to our findings in section 3.4.2.1, the RNV is not equal across treatments 
(Kruskal-Wallis test on the group level, χ²=10.245 with df=2; p=.006). The average RNV in 
bonus is significantly higher than in control (MWU-test for control vs. bonus z=-2.887 and 
p=.0039), while there are no significant differences between control and ranking (MWU-test 
                                                 
32 Keep in mind that the RNV is not a measure of the optimality of decisions for groups at large. This would 
require us to calculate each potential path and outcome for each decision. Obviously, this calculation task is 




for control vs. ranking z=-0.635 and p=.5254). Accordingly, subjects in bonus tend to 
perform better when controlling for path dependency. 
 
Figure 3.4. Average values for the RNV’s determinants over periods by treatment 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the dynamics of the RNV and its determinants over periods for all 
treatments. The graph hints at a superior creation of opportunities (M) in control, which can 
be explained by higher levels of cooperation. Nonetheless, subjects fail to keep up with the 
increase in opportunities, which leads to the inferior RNV values illustrated in table 3.3. 
Overall, the same pattern of subjects not being able to exploit expanding opportunities is 
evident for all treatments. The creation of opportunities is lower in bonus and ranking, which 
restricts the maximal achievable income and thus leads to a higher average RNV in bonus.33 
This difference becomes apparent in figure 3.5, which further shows that the RNV is 
deteriorating over time for all treatments, corresponding to the increasing number of untapped 
opportunities as the game proceeds. Recall that the actual payoff π(cit) depends on the royalty 
fees that have to be paid. Therefore, the decrease in the maximal achievable income in 
ranking and bonus has to be explained by lower royalties demanded in control. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Applying a Mann-Whitney-U test for control vs. bonus for the maximum M (minimum m) indicates a 
significant difference, with z=1.848 and p=.0647 (z=3.522 and p=.0004). There are no such differences between 
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Figure 3.5. Average RNV over periods by treatment 
 
 
RESULT 4: When controlling for the actual choice set, a prize for the best innovation 
substantially increases the exploitation of innovation opportunities, whereas a prize for the 
aggregate innovativeness does not lead to similar effects. This effect is driven by differences 
in the demanded royalty fees. The increase in exploitation of innovation opportunities for a 
prize for the aggregate innovativeness is thus not due to better performance but rather 
reflects the inferior creation of individual income opportunities. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
The present article provides novel empirical perspective on the discussion regarding the use of 
innovation contests as a policy instrument to foster innovation activity. Accordingly, we 
transfer a sequential innovation setting to the lab by building upon a real effort word creation 
task. We analyze cooperation behavior and innovativeness in two types of innovation 
contests, namely a prize for the aggregate innovativeness and an additional prize for the best 
innovation. Our results show that both types of contests substantially reduce the willingness to 
cooperate among subjects, as demanded royalty fees significantly increase. Nevertheless, this 
does not reduce the actual cooperation, i.e. the propensity to make use of other innovators’ 
products. Despite the higher royalty fees in the innovation contest treatments, the total 

















paying higher royalty fees when striving to win an innovation contest. Our results further 
indicate that the intensified competition in innovation contests tends to reduce the individual 
income opportunities, given that higher royalty fees have to be paid.  
Moreover, we derive some general policy implications. Let us consider the potential effects 
of innovation contests on aggregate welfare. Our results show that welfare is not necessarily 
increased, especially when opportunities to innovate are restricted, e.g. by the sequentiality of 
the process itself or constraints in the available investment capital. Furthermore, when 
considering the transaction costs for organizing the contest and the costs of the prize itself, 
overall welfare might substantially decrease. This issue is particularly relevant for state-
subsidized contests, whereby taxes are reallocated while no adequate gains in innovation 
activity might be achieved.  
Furthermore, the decreasing willingness to cooperate due to innovation contests hints at the 
emergence of patent races. It has been shown both experimentally and theoretically that patent 
races might lead to excessive spending on innovation activity and welfare losses (Loury 1979; 
Zizzo 2002; Silipo 2005; Judd et al. 2012). Therefore, we would suggest that the additional 
competitive pressure induced by prizes is likely to lead to adverse effects, particularly in 
domains that require broad cooperation among different individuals and groups.  
It is important to note that innovation contests boost the effectiveness and importance of 
intellectual property rights as higher royalty fees are demanded. The willingness to cooperate 
decreases and an innovation system dominated by competition becomes prevalent. The 
simultaneous use of these policy instruments – i.e. contests and intellectual property rights – 
thus might have mutually amplifying negative effects, reducing aggregate welfare. Put briefly, 
intellectual property rights and innovation contests overlap and as intellectual property rights 
are established in almost every industrialized country, the implementation of state-subsidized 
innovation contests to foster innovation should be called into question. As suggested by 
Clancy and Moschini (2013), a system with a hybrid use – where innovators choose between 
intellectual property rights and an innovation prize – might be a solution to prevent these 
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Instructions for all treatments 
 
Note: The differences between treatments are indicated in square brackets. The original 




In this game, your task is to build words using letters as in the board game “Scrabble”. By 
building words, you increase your payoff: for each word, you receive a payoff calculated by 
the sum of the values of each letter. You start the game with an endowment of 4 letters. 
During the course of the game, you are able to buy additional letters. 
During the course of the game, you will play in a group of 4 players. 
 
The Payoff 
[bonus: Your payoff results from two components: 1. The sum of the value of your letters] 
Your payoff depends on the sum of the value of your letters, which is calculated in 
experimental tokens. You start the game with an endowment of 75 tokens.  
[control and bonus: One token is converted to €0.12 at the end of the experiment. Note that it 
is possible to end the experiment with less than your starting endowment.] 
[bonus: €10-bonus for the “most valuable” word: Additionally, you compete with your 3 
group members: The “most valuable” word is rewarded with a bonus of €10 at the end of 
the game. The player who added the last letter to the word that is valued with the most tokens 
receives the €10 bonus.] 
[ranking: In this game, you compete with your three group members. Your payoff at the end 
of the experiment depends on the tokens you score compared to your group members: The 
player with the most tokens receives €24, while each of the other three players receives €12.] 
[ranking and bonus: You can see how well you are performing compared to your group 
members at the bottom-right on the general view on the main board (see page 2).] 
 
Please note the table below containing all letters, their value (in tokens) and the frequency 
with which they occur in the game. During the game, the letters are always displayed along 
with their value. 
 
Table A3.1. List of letters 
Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency 
A 1 10 J 6 2 S 1 14 
B 3 4 K 4 4 T 1 12 
C 4 4 L 2 6 U 1 12 
D 1 8 M 3 8 V 6 2 
E 1 30 N 1 18 W 3 2 
F 4 4 O 2 6 X 8 2 
G 2 6 P 4 2 Y 10 2 
H 2 8 Q 10 2 Z 3 2 
I 1 12 R 1 12    
 
On the next page, you will find a screenshot of the main board of the game and some 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Course of a Turn 
 
When it is your turn, a dialog pops up asking you for choices. During your turn, you cannot 
use the spellchecker. You have 45 seconds for your decisions. You can see the remaining time 
at the top-left corner of the screen. If your time expires, you are subtracted 1 token from your 
endowment for every additional 10 seconds.  
Every turn comprises three phases:  
 
1. Buying phase 
 
 
Your activity: Buying letters 
You can choose to buy or not to buy one letter at the price of 2 tokens. If you buy a letter, 
it will be chosen randomly from the list of letters shown on the table A3.1. At the 
beginning, you are given four letters for free. Each letter can only be used once: after 
producing or extending a word, the letter will be deleted from your letter set.  
 
2. Word phase 
 
Your activity: Producing or extending words 
You can use German words, their conjugations and declinations and some names of places 
and persons. You can test if a word is correct using the spellchecker when it is not your 
turn. Correct words can be built as follows: 
 
Option 1:        Producing a 3-letter word 
 
a) You can produce a word using exactly three of your letters.  
The payoff that you earn for creating a word is given by the sum of the value of the 
letters (Example: ‘pol’: p = 4, o = 2, l = 2. This results in 4+2+2 = 8 tokens). 
 
To create a word, you have to type in the letters with your keyboard. 
Please note that you cannot undo mistakes: if you make an error while inputting 
the word (i.e. inputting a too long, too short, non-existent or misspelled word, or 
pressing the enter key on an empty field), the turn passes to the next player. You 
will only have the opportunity to reiterate your entry correctly in the next period, 
during your next turn. 
 
Option 2:        Extending a word 
 
b) You can extend an existing word by inserting one letter in any position in the 
word. For example, ‘ast’ can be extended into ‘last’, ‘rast’ and ‘aste’, and ‘last’ 
again into ‘laust’ and this into ‘klaust’. It is not possible to rearrange existing 
words (e.g. to build from ‘ast’ the word ‘star’).  
Your payoff results from the sum of the value of the letters of the newly-extended 
word. By extending e.g. ‘last’ into ‘laust’, you get l = 2, a = 1, u = 1, s = 1, t = 1, so 
2+1+1+1+1 = 6 tokens. Every word can only be produced once but can 
subsequently be used for as many extensions as possible. 
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Option 3:        Passing 
 
c) In case you are unable to produce or extend any word, you can pass the turn to the 
next player. 
 
3. Royalty phase 
 
Your activity: Setting a royalty fee 
After producing a word, you have to set a royalty fee that other players are required to pay 
when creating extensions. The fee must be set between 0 and 100 percent of the value of the 
word. 
 
Figure A3.1. Intellectual property choice 
 
 
If another player extends your word, he automatically transfers the fee to you. 
 
- 0 percent means that the word is entirely free for other players. 
- At 100 percent, the next player only receives the value of his added letter.  
- The choice of 20 percent means that the respective player has to pay 20 percent of the 
value of the word to you. 
 
The royalty fee for a word remains fixed during the entire game. The word appears on the list 
of public words on the main board and can be used by everyone. However, other players have 
to pay the royalty fee when extending the word. 
Furthermore, you will have to set a royalty fee if you extend a word with one letter. In this 
case, you decide on the fee only for your added letter. Your payoff results from the sum of the 
value of all letters minus the royalty fee for the word that you built upon. 
 
After that, your turn ends and it is the next player’s turn. The game is played for 25 periods.  
Finally, some payoff-examples are offered for clarification: 
 
Examples of Potential Payoffs: 
 
Example 1: If player 1 sets a royalty fee of 90 percent for the word ‘ast’ (value of the word 3 
tokens: a = 1, s = 1, t = 1) and player 2 extends the word into ‘hast’ (value of h = 2), this 
results in the following payoffs: 
Player 1: 90 percent of 3 tokens = 2.7 tokens (royalty fee for player 1) 




Example 2: If player 1 sets the royalty fee of 0 percent for ‘ast’, player 2 receives the sum of 
the value of all letters for extending it into ‘hast’: 
Player 1: 0 percent of 3 tokens = 0 token 
Player 2: 100 percent of 5 tokens = 5 tokens 
 
Example 3: After extending a word, the player has to set a royalty fee for the added letter. 
Player 1 sets a royalty fee of 10 percent for ‘ast’ and player 2 sets a royalty fee of 50 percent 
for the letter ‘h’ in ‘hast’. If player 3 then extends ‘hast’ into ‘haust’, this results in the 
following payoffs:  
Player 1: 10 percent of 3 tokens = 0.3 (royalty fee for player 1) 
Player 2: 50 percent of 2 tokens = 1 (royalty fee for player 2)  






Instructions for the word task 
 
Note: The instructions for the word task were shown on screen. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
In the next screen, you will see a string comprising 9 letters. 
You will be asked to create as many German words as possible using these letters within 3 
minutes. 
You can type the words you create in the field beneath the string of 9 letters and submit them 
by hitting Enter. 
You can use each letter only once per word and a word cannot be shorter than 3 letters. 
Longer words generate more points. 
3-letter word: 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 points 
4-letter word: 4+ 3 + 2 + 1 = 10 points 
etc. 
After the 3 minutes have expired, the test will end and you will be shown your results. 
As soon as you enter the next screen, the timer will start ticking. 
To proceed to the next screen, please press the letter ‘R’ on your keyboard. 
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Appendix C 
Results of the control task 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Treatment or group comparisons might heavily depend on the task-specific knowledge of 
some participants. As four subjects interact and potentially cooperate on only one innovation 
market, observations are not independent. A group’s performance might be driven by a single 
subject showing very high or very low ability with respect to the word task. Therefore, we 
carried out an additional task before the experiment, which allows us to control for individual 
task-specific knowledge when analyzing innovation activity. We implement a task introduced 
by Eckartz et al. (2012): within three minutes, subjects are asked to build as many words as 
possible out of a 12-letter set (accehhikllst). Subjects accumulate points by building words, 
where points assigned increase disproportionally with word length. According to the 
aggregate points, the best three subjects of each session are paid 1€, which should guarantee 
that subjects put real effort into building words according to their best ability. Figure A3.2 
shows the achieved points over groups by treatment. 
 
Figure A3.2. Control task results over group by treatment 
 
There are no substantial differences across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test gives χ²=1.461 
with df=2 and p=.4817), while evidently there is some heterogeneity in task-specific 































4. The effectiveness of public subsidies 





























The effects of public subsidies in supporting private innovative activity is subject to long-
standing political and scientific debates. Since the empirical findings remain largely 
inconclusive, this study adds to this debate with counterfactual evidence from a laboratory 
experiment. In a creative real effort task simulating the innovation process, two distinct means 
of allocating subsidies are compared to a benchmark treatment without subsidies to identify 
their effects in fostering innovativeness. Furthermore, subjects’ cooperative behavior in 
relation to subsidies is investigated. Overall, subsidies lead to a substantial crowding-out of 
private investment. While the individual revenues increase due to the subsidy, the innovative 
activity fails to increase and less sophisticated innovations are realized. Consequently, 
subsidies have no positive and even negative effects on overall welfare, depending on the 
subsidy specifics. However, subsidies do not influence cooperative behavior. These findings 
imply that the additional costs of subsidies for innovations might not be warranted by gains 





creativity, innovation policy, laboratory experiment, real effort task, subsidies 
 
JEL-Classification 
C91, H25, O31  
87 
4.1. Introduction 
Industrialized states use a broad composition of different policy instruments to stimulate 
innovations and thus promote the growth of their economies. This long-standing political 
objective has fostered broad discussions among policy-makers as well as in the scientific 
community about the determinants of innovation-based growth and the most effective policy 
mix in terms of incentivizing firms and individuals to innovate (Flanagan et al. 2011; 
Guerzoni and Raiteri 2015). Among the most frequently used regulatory instruments are 
direct monetary subsidies in the form of government grants provided to firms that develop and 
implement innovative products and services. Advocates of this form of governmental support 
claim that subsidies can help to increase the overall level of innovative activity, which would 
otherwise fail to reach a desirable level from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, it is argued 
that monetary subsidies can be distributed efficiently; for example, by implementing specific 
tax regulations or funding specific projects. By contrast, opponents of innovation subsidies 
point to a selection bias problem, criticizing that the distribution of subsidies tends to be 
selective and often fails to allocate funds optimally, thereby providing support for firms that 
are considered successful beforehand and would succeed regardless. Moreover, it is argued 
that the supported firms might use the grants more carelessly than their own resources, 
possibly resulting in dissipating or idle behavior. In addition, it is pointed out that the 
administration and allocation of subsidies entails considerable costs for the state and 
potentially leads to a crowding-out of private investment without increasing innovations and 
growth overall (Jaffe 2002). 
The controversial debate on innovation subsidies among policy-makers is reflected in the 
scientific debate, which has yielded inconclusive findings on the economic effects of 
subsidies in fostering innovation activities (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). Aiming to craft more 
effective economic policies using theoretical and empirical analyses, a large number of 
empirical studies have examined the effect of subsidies. The results of these studies range 
from an additive effect on private R&D (Aerts and Schmidt 2008), no effect (González and 
Pazó 2008) to a crowding-out of private investment (Wallsten 2000). Furthermore, the effects 
of subsidies and cooperation on innovative firm behavior are emphasized, with a number of 
studies arguing that cooperation can positively influence innovative activities (Czarnitzki et 
al. 2007; Fornahl et al. 2011; Nishimura and Okamuro 2011). Blasio et al. (2014) sum up the 
ambiguous findings on the effectiveness of subsidies and the lack of unequivocal evidence 
with a basic methodological problem: “Beyond public declarations and legitimate hopes, 
however, there is little agreement on the effectiveness of public spending to foster private 
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R&D. The reason is that to evaluate the effects of government-sponsored programs it is 
necessary to address the intrinsically difficult counterfactual question of what would have 
happened without the subsidies” (Blasio et al. 2014, 26). 
Building upon the statement by Blasio and colleagues, this paper aims to contribute novel 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of innovation subsidies by creating an 
experimental setting that enables investigating counterfactual questions. Similar to Sørensen 
et al. (2010)’s suggestion, a series of laboratory experiments is conducted to analyze the 
effects of subsidies on the investment in and emergence of innovations. This setting is 
implemented to simulate the innovation process and thus compare ceteris paribus whether 
innovators receiving different forms of subsidies act systematically differently from those 
without external funding. While replicating the creative and dynamic innovation process 
within a task feasible for student subjects places certain restraints on the external validity of 
the results, the methodological approach has strong advantages; namely, the first 
counterfactual analysis of the effects of different forms of innovation subsidies can be 
presented, which includes the key features of innovation – i.e. risky investments, ownership 
and creativity – and thus completely reproduces the cumulative innovation process. To this 
end, a novel experimental setting is used that builds upon the board game Scrabble, in which 
subjects use letters to create words, are compensated for their innovation and are allowed to 
set license fees for their newly-created words (Crosetto 2010; Brüggemann et al. 2015). 
In the first experiment, a benchmark treatment without subsidies is compared to a 
treatment in which subjects are provided with additional material resources in the form of 
extra letters; thus, the subsidy is limited to the use in innovative activities. In the second 
experiment, the benchmark is compared to a treatment providing subjects with monetary 
subsidies that can be used to buy additional letters. On a continuum ranging from a restrictive 
grant-in-aid to a freely-usable financial assistance, this experiment implements two distinct 
variants that tend towards either end of the continuum. In both settings, license fees can be 
imposed on innovations, which provide a measure of cooperative behavior among 
participants. The experiments thus only differ with respect to the form of the subsidies. In 
both benchmark treatments, subjects are required to buy their letters: in the first experiment, 
subjects receive a free letter each period; while in the second experiment, they receive an 
additional payoff worth one letter in each period. With this experimental design, the effect of 
the two different forms of subsidies on individual investment and cooperation behavior can be 
tested to assess which more effectively increases innovativeness. 
89 
The results indicate that subsidies have no positive effects on individual innovativeness 
and overall welfare. Providing additional material resources restricted to the use in 
innovations yield no differences in welfare; indeed, offering freely-usable additional monetary 
resources even leads to a loss in overall welfare. Although innovators’ individual incomes 
increase due to the subsidies, no increase in the innovative activity results; rather, subsidies 
substantially crowd out private investment. Regarding the specifics of innovations, subsidies 
foster the realization of less sophisticated innovations. In turn, cooperative behavior – as 
measured by the level of license fees chosen – is not affected by subsidies. From a policy 
perspective, the results indicate that subsidies may not yield positive effects in terms of 
innovativeness and overall welfare and they could even induce negative overall welfare 
effects when accounting for their additional costs to the state. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the 
literature on subsidies and innovation, before section 4.3 explains in detail the experimental 
design and section 4.4 describes the behavioral hypotheses. The experimental results are 
provided in section 4.5 and section 4.6 provides policy implications and finally concludes. 
4.2. Literature Review 
There is a large body of empirical literature discussing the effectiveness of public subsidies by 
examining different government programs.34 In a literature review, David et al. (2000) report 
that no crowding-out of private innovation investments through public subsidies occurs in 
two-thirds of the studies, whereby the crowding-out effect seems stronger in the USA 
compared with Europe. Therefore, in the majority of the studies reviewed, public subsidies 
are shown to have a positive impact on the innovative activity. Overall, Klette et al. (2000) 
also find positive results when comparing five empirical studies in detail, yet they also point 
to methodological problems inherent in the studies. By contrast, in a more recent review, 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) sum up the literature by stating that the effectiveness of public 
subsidies has to be called into question due to the improved data quality in recent years. From 
a financial market perspective, Hall and Lerner (2010) survey the discussion of a “funding 
gap” in the investment for innovations and emphasize that further research should be 
conducted, ideally in an experimental or quasi-experimental setting.35 
Overall, the empirical evidence for developed countries is inconclusive, with many studies 
pointing to a positive impact on private innovative activity (Almus and Czarnitzki 2003; 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004; Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Hussinger 2008; Aschhoff 2009; 
                                                 
34 For a generalist overview of innovation research see Hong et al. (2012). 
35 For the specific effects of tax incentives see Hall and van Reenen (2000). 
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Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Duch et al. 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento 2012; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento 2014). Similarly, a number of studies also identify mixed effects on the 
innovative activity (Cerulli and Potì 2008; Busom 2000; Heijs and Herrera 2004; González et 
al. 2005; Görg and Strobl 2007; Clausen 2009; Fantino and Cannone 2013; Bronzini and 
Iachini 2014; Becker 2015). Conversely, other studies do not support these results and find no 
positive effects of public support on innovative activity (Lach 2002; Hujer and Radić 2005; 
González and Pazó 2008; Norrman and Bager-Sjögren 2010; Blasio et al. 2014). Furthermore, 
a few authors show a full or partial crowding-out of private investment as an unintended 
negative effect of subsidies (Goolsbee 1998; Wallsten 2000). 
Moreover, many studies on the determinants of innovativeness find a positive impact of 
cooperation on the innovation output (Branstetter and Sakakibara 2002; Becker and Dietz 
2004; Aschhoff and Schmidt 2008; Faria et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2012). Discussing the 
effects of cooperation on subsidized innovative activity, Czarnitzki et al. (2007) assume that 
the innovative output of collaborating by non-subsidized firms would increase when 
participating in grant-in-aid programs. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) show positive effects 
of subsidies on joint innovative activity after subsidy programs have ended, with their results 
indicating that indirect support programs have a strong impact on the innovative activity. For 
firms cooperating in research activities, Fornahl et al. (2011) show that state subsidies 
increase the innovative activity, as measured by patent applications. However, this finding 
does not hold for single firms. Falck et al. (2010) find positive effects on the innovative 
activity of firms that pursue a cluster-oriented policy, yet a decrease in private innovation 
expenditure. Furthermore, Sakakibara (2001) shows that subsidies have a slightly negative 
effect on cooperating firms’ investment in innovation. 
From a methodological perspective, Blasio et al. (2014) and Cerulli (2010) provide an 
overview of the existing empirical methods to analyze the effects of subsidies on 
innovativeness and discuss the problems concerned with analyzing the data in this particular 
field. They state that the impact of innovation subsidies cannot be effectively separated from 
unrelated effects and they declare that counterfactual evidence is required for more definite 
empirical evidence. Therefore, Sørensen et al. (2010) suggest that experimental methods 
should be introduced to innovation research. To date, a small number of experimental studies 
have dealt with topics of innovation and analyzing different innovation policy instruments. 
Eckartz et al. (2012) test the effects of different incentive schemes and find no substantial 
differences between payment schemes. Cantner et al. (2009) simulate a patent race by means 
of a multidimensional search task with uncertainty, finding that the difference in the subjects’ 
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earnings has a positive impact on their investment in the next periods. Ederer and Manso 
(2013) analyze different payment schemes for innovators by implementing a search task and 
observe that the possibility of early failure and rewarding long-term success motivates 
innovators more than pay-for-performance or a fixed wage. Focusing on the policy instrument 
of intellectual property rights, Buchanan and Wilson (2014) also conduct a search task to 
simulate innovative activity, providing evidence that innovative activity is fostered by 
intellectual property rights yet simultaneously induces higher prices for innovations. Meloso 
et al. (2009) use the knapsack problem as a search task, in which participants have to combine 
items of a specific value and weight in the optimal combination to simulate the innovation 
process. They show that innovativeness is higher in a free market-based system compared 
with a patent-based system. 
Extending these studies to more accurately simulate the crucial features of innovation 
processes in the laboratory, recent experiments have introduced elements of investment, 
ownership and creativity in their tasks. Crosetto (2010) first implemented a real effort word 
creation task to test for innovation behavior, providing subjects the possibility to choose the 
preferred regulatory incentive scheme, namely open source or fixed license fees. Based upon 
the board game Scrabble, the innovation process is simulated by having subjects create and 
extend words. Following this approach, Brüggemann et al. (2015) extend the design by 
implementing endogenous license fees and thus showing an increase in welfare without 
intellectual property rights. Considering different institutional mechanisms for fostering 
innovation, Brüggemann and Meub (2015) use the same experimental approach, showing that 
innovation contests reduce the willingness to cooperate between innovators and do not lead to 
additional gains in innovative activity and welfare. Further building upon the experimental 
design introduced by Crosetto (2010), a real effort word creation task is implemented to test 
the effectiveness of subsidies as a policy instrument. Hence, two experiments are run to 
investigate the effect of two different forms innovation subsidies, namely providing resources 
exclusively determined for use in innovations and providing additional financial resources 
unrestricted to a specific application. 
4.3. Experimental Design 
4.3.1. Design 
General properties of the game 
To determine the effect of subsidies on the individual innovation behavior in a sequential 
setting, a real effort word creation task inspired by the board game Scrabble is implemented. 
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During the experiment, subjects have to act both strategically and creatively, facing the 
investment decision of buying letters and acting creatively by building words, thus generating 
their payoff. Additionally, subjects are able to set a license fee for their newly-created words, 
which can be extended by other players in the course of the game. The experiment closely 
builds upon the experimental design introduced by Crosetto (2010) and has been modified by 
Brüggemann et al. (2015) and Brüggemann and Meub (2015). 
This basic setting is extended using a within-subject design, whereby each subject plays 
12 periods of the real effort word creation task twice, once in the control group and once in 
the treatment group. The order of control and treatment groups is reversed for half of the 
subjects to control for distortions due to the sequence of treatments. The game is played in 
groups of four players, who are randomly matched for the first part over 12 periods. Once all 
subjects have finished the first part, subjects are again randomly matched for the second part 
of the game, similarly comprising 12 periods. In both parts of the game, each subject is 
endowed with 50 tokens and four randomly pre-selected letters.36 
 
Course of a turn 
In each period and treatment, subjects run through five phases, for which figure 4.1 provides 
an overview. 
 












Setting a license 
fee
Buying no, one or 
two letters
Production phase I License phase I Production phase II License phase II Buying phase
 
In the production phase, subjects are asked to choose between producing a three-letter 
word (root), extending an already existing word (extension) or passing the turn. If subjects 
create or extend a word, they are asked whether or not they wish to set a license fee in the 
                                                 
36 Before the main task starts, subjects had to complete a short control task, in which their word-finding skills 
were tested. The instructions for the control task can be found in appendix B, the results in appendix C. 
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ensuing license phase. The production and license phases are played twice in each turn. In the 
last phase of each turn – the investment phase – subjects can buy up to two new letters. 
Creating a word 
A root must comprise exactly three letters and it yields a payoff equal to the sum of the values 
of the letters used. Each word can be extended several times with exactly one letter in each 
production phase at every position of the original word, although every word can only be 
produced once in the game. A newly-created or extended word is only accepted if it exists in 
the standard MS Windows dictionary for German. A letter has the same value as in the 
German version of the board game Scrabble, which is determined inversely proportional to its 
frequency in the German language; for example, the letter e has the value 1 and the letter x the 
value 8. The payoff for each word is calculated by the sum of all letters of the word. This also 
applies if a player adds a letter without having produced the original word. Thus, adding a 
letter to an existing word generally yields a higher payoff than producing a root. Consider for 
example37: given the letters a, e, r and t, a subject can create the roots art, ear or rat. If the 
respective letters are available, art can be extended into arts and dart or part − and part again 
into apart or party. The root art has a value of 1+1+1=3 tokens, whereas the extension apart 
has a value of 1+3+1+1+1=7 tokens. 
 
Setting license fees and buying letters 
Subjects are required to choose whether they wish to set a license fee or not. If subjects decide 
to set a license fee for their root, they are required to choose values between 10% and 100% 
of the word value in 10% steps. The license fee subsequently remains fixed up to the end of 
the 12 periods. After extending a word, subjects only set the license fee for the newly-added 
letter, as the license fee for the other letters is already defined by the previous producers. The 
new word – along with its license fee, the value and the producer – is displayed in the public 
word list on the game’s main screen. By setting license fees, subjects receive additional 
income whenever another person extends a word with a license fee. However, license fees 
cannot be used as a mechanism to exclude other subjects from using a word altogether; rather, 
higher license fees merely make it less profitable for other players to use the word for an 
extension. Thus, license fees can be interpreted as a measure for cooperative behavior, 
whereby higher license fees indicate a low willingness to cooperate, i.e. making the access to 
one’s words expensive. Lower fees show a higher willingness to cooperate by making 
extensions more profitable for other players. Furthermore, there are no transaction costs for 
                                                 
37 The game was run in German. However, word examples and instructions are provided in an English 
translation in appendix A and B. 
94 
the license fees, meaning that they can be interpreted as an instrument of redistribution within 
groups. 
To illustrate this mechanism, consider again the example given above: the root art is worth 
3 tokens and subject A sets a license fee of 60%. Subsequently, every subject who extends art 
automatically pays 1.8 tokens to subject A. Afterwards, subject B adds the letter p – worth 3 
tokens – and extends art into part. Due to this action, 1.8 tokens are transferred to subject A 
and subject B earns 1.2 tokens for art plus 3 tokens for the letter p, which yields 4.2 tokens 
for subject B. Furthermore, subject B also has to set a license fee for the p in the word part, 
e.g. 50%. Subsequently, subject C creates the word apart and pays 1.8 tokens to subject A, 
1.5 tokens to subject B and earns 3.7 tokens. 
At the end of each turn, in the investment phase, subjects are asked to buy no, one or two 
letters for a price of 4 tokens each. 
 
Being not at turn 
Subjects can monitor the main board of the game when it is not their turn. Accordingly, they 
can see their letters, current earnings, follow the actions of the other subjects and see the list 
of all words produced. Furthermore, they can prepare their next turn by checking words and 
extensions with a free interactive spellchecker. This is necessary as new words are only 
accepted if they are implemented in the MS Windows dictionary. 
 
Welfare considerations 
Altogether, the welfare created in the game depends on the relative number of extensions, 
given that the expected value of a letter is negative: buying a letter costs 4 tokens, yet the 
average value of a letter is 1.87. Therefore, buying a letter is a risky investment for a potential 
innovator, as it might lead to negative returns. Consequently, if a group only produced roots, 
it would experience a decline in welfare as their initial endowment would continually 
decrease during the game. Only by creating extensions can letters be utilized several times 
and thus increase overall welfare. 
4.3.2. Treatment conditions and experimental procedure 
Two experiments were implemented to test for two potential designs of subsidies. They only 
differ compared with the control treatment in terms of the allocation of resources, as shown in 
table 4.1. In a within-subject design, both treatments are tested against control, where subjects 
do not receive a subsidy and are allowed to buy up to two letters at the end of their respective 
turn. In the first experiment (ExLetter) in subsidy, subjects receive an additional letter for free 
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at the end of their respective turn and are allowed to buy one more letter. In the second 
experiment (ExMoney), in subsidy, subjects receive four additional tokens at the end of their 
turns, which is equivalent to the cost of one letter. As in control, they are allowed to buy up to 
two more letters at the end of their respective turn. In both ExLetter and ExMoney, subjects 
are informed in each turn that they receive the additional resource or the additional money, 
respectively. The order of the treatments is reversed in half of the sessions to compensate for 
learning and other effects related to the order of treatments. 
 
Table 4.1. Overview of the treatment conditions 
 ExLetter ExMoney 
first part control subsidy control subsidy 
second part subsidy control subsidy control 
no. of participants 36 36 40 36 
 
The 191 letters used in the game were distributed in a fixed yet random order to make the 
actions of the groups better comparable. Therefore, the order in which the letters were 
allocated to the subjects was randomly predetermined for each game before the experiment. 
Half of the subjects in each experiment first received the letterset from Brüggemann et al. 
(2015) in the first part of the game and a newly-created letterset in the second part, which was 
similarly randomly predetermined. For the other half of the subjects, the order in which the 
lettersets were used was reversed. This reversal of lettersets was again used to compensate for 
effects connected to the order of the letters. 
The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Behavioral Economics at the 
University of Göttingen with a sample of 148 subjects from different academic disciplines. 
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004), whereby each subject was allowed 
to participate in one session only and none had previously participated in a similar 
experiment. The experiments took place in April 2014 and each session lasted around 90 
minutes. On average, participants were 24.9 years old, 48.0% were female and 39.2% were 
students of economics. Each participant earned €16.99 on average, with a minimum payoff of 
€8.3 and a maximum of €30.2. 
4.4. Hypotheses 
With this experimental design, novel insight is provided for the counterfactual question 
concerning what effects result with and without subsidies ceteris paribus. The design provides 
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insights concerning how subsidies influence the individual behavior of innovators and thus it 
complements discussions on innovation subsidies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). 
First, the potential effects of subsidies on the cooperative behavior of subjects can be 
addressed. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) find a positive impact of subsidies on innovative 
activities pursued in inter-firm cooperations, thus increasing the innovative output of 
participating firms. Consequently, the output of firms working in innovation networks is often 
higher compared to that of firms innovating independently (Falck et al. 2010; Fornahl et al. 
2011; Nishimura and Okamuro 2011). To further investigate the effect of subsidies on 
cooperative behavior and the individual innovative activity, the individual choices of license 
fees can be used in our setting. Based upon the previous studies suggesting a positive effect of 
subsidies on cooperative behavior in innovative activities, hypothesis 1 is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (“Cooperation behavior”) 
Cooperative behavior increases in subsidy in both experiments when compared to 
control. 
 
Second, the investment behavior can be investigated when analyzing the letters acquired 
and the individual revenue for the innovators. The majority of empirical studies argue that 
public support does not lead to a crowding-out of private investment in most cases (David et 
al. 2000). However, some more recent studies question this assumption (Blasio et al. 2014; 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). This open question can be addressed as the individual investment 
situation has been implemented accordingly. Recall that a letter in this setting costs 4 tokens, 
while the average return of a letter is 1.87, which makes buying an additional letter a risky 
investment. Hence, subjects rationally restrain their investments and refrain from buying as 
many resources as possible. In this situation, additional resources lead to either increased 
innovativeness – as intended by regulators – or a crowding-out of private investments and an 
unchanged number of innovations. Again, following the majority of previous empirical 
studies, it is hypothesized that subjects will add the subsidies to their private investment; thus, 
there should be no crowding-out of private investment and individual revenues should 
increase. Therefore, hypothesis two is formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (“Investment & revenue”) 
a) There is an increase of private investment in subsidy in both experiments when 
compared to control. 
97 
b) Crowding-out of private investment does not occur in subsidy when compared to 
control. 
c) The individual revenue is higher in subsidy in both experiments when compared to 
control. 
 
Third, despite increasing recent doubts regarding the positive effects of subsidizing private 
innovative activities (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014), a substantial number of studies emphasize 
that innovation subsidies have positive effects on a country’s overall innovative capacities and 
thus economic welfare (Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004; David et al. 2000; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento 2014). To contribute to the ongoing discussion, the overall welfare effects of 
innovation subsidies are tested in this setting. Following the studies showing positive 
innovative effects and the previous behavioral hypotheses, the basic expectation is that 
subsidies will induce additional innovations and thus increase the overall welfare generated, 
as measured by the aggregated value of all words. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
derived: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (“Welfare”) 
a) The aggregated innovative activity is higher in subsidy in both experiments when 
compared to control. 
b) The welfare is higher in subsidy in both experiments when compared to control. 
4.5. Results 
To answer the research questions as formulated in the hypotheses presented above, the results 
are structured as follows. First, the cooperation behavior is investigated, before the results on 
the individual level of the game are described, namely subjects’ investment and revenue. 
Subsequently, the innovative activity is analyzed before the welfare perspective is taken into 
account and different measures of welfare are discussed. 
4.5.1. Cooperation behavior 
After having created a word, subjects were asked whether they would like to choose a license 
fee or not. If subjects wanted to set a license fee, they could chose between 10 and 100%. As 
discussed above, the license fees chosen can be interpreted as a measure for cooperative 
behavior (H1), whereby the higher the license fees, the less subjects are willing to let other 
subjects benefit from extending their produced words. 
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To analyze cooperative behavior, the number of words without license fees can be 
considered as an initial measure. In ExLetter, in control, 3.31% of all words did not have a 
license fee; in subsidy 2.10%; in ExMoney subjects did not select to set a license fee in control 
for 3.29% and in subsidy for 2.92% of all produced words. This low measures show a strong 
demand for being rewarded for the created innovations. The major factor is the average 
license fees over periods for each experiment, as presented in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Average license fees over periods by treatment and experiment 
a) ExLetter b) ExMoney 
 
 
The level of license fees and thus the cooperative behavior remains fairly constant over 
time, given that there are no differences across treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test 
for ExLetter z=-0.631, p=.5277; for ExMoney z=0.161, p=.8721). There are no learning or 
last-round effects that occur due to the within-subject design, as assessed by testing whether 
there are differences due to the order of treatments. The difference in the level of license fees 
is calculated between the order (1) control and subsidy and the alternative treatment order 
(2) subsidy and control. There are no significant differences when comparing the differences 
with respect to the order for the level of license fees (Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) test for 
ExLetter z=-1.634, p=.1023, for ExMoney z=-1.470, p=.1416). 
Overall, subsidies do not have a detrimental influence on the cooperation behavior in our 
setting. Accordingly, it could be argued that the findings by Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) – 
who showed positive effects of subsidies on cooperative innovative activities – might not hold 
at the individual level. 
 
RESULT 1: There is no evidence in favor of H1 as cooperative behavior remains stable over 
time and across treatments. 
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4.5.2. Investment and individual revenue 
To gain an overview of individual behavior in the experiments, the revenue and the 
investment behavior are discussed, whereby revenue is represented by the cumulative income 
with and without the subsidy and investment by the letters acquired during the game. Recall 
that in control and subsidy of ExMoney, a group as a whole can buy up to 88 letters, while in 
ExLetter in subsidy, 44 letters are received for free and 44 letters can be bought by the 
subjects. The letters stock denotes a subject’s average number of unused letters over the 
course of each treatment. The subsidy is interpreted as the resources transferred to each 
subject by the state. In ExLetter, the subsidy amounts to the value of four tokens for each 
letter received for free. In ExMoney, the subsidy equals the amount of the four free tokens, 
which add up to 44 additional tokens over 11 periods (excluding the final period, where no 
subsidy is provided). All these main indicators are reported in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Overview of investment and revenue by treatment and player 
  ExLetter ExMoney 
  control subsidy control subsidy 































Note: For letters acquired in ExLetter in subsidy the amount of 44 tokens for letters received for free is added. 
 
The table shows that introducing a subsidy increases the number of letters acquired in both 
experiments.38 However, not the entire amount provided is invested in additional letters. 
Subjects buy more letters in subsidy in ExLetter (WSR-test z=-3.006, p=.0026), albeit only 
when including the 44 letters received for free in subsidy. In ExMoney, there are no significant 
differences in the investment behavior between treatments (WSR-test z=-1.269, p=.2043), 
                                                 
38 Following the procedure outlined in chapter 5.1, the different orders of the treatments do not influence the 
number of letters acquired: MWU-test for ExLetter z=0.972, p=.3309, for ExMoney z=1.436, p=.1509; further, 
they do not influence income and income excluding subsidy: MWU-test for ExLetter z=-1.192, p=.2332, for 
ExMoney z=-0.735, p=.4624. The sequence order only makes a difference for letters stock: MWU-test for 
ExLetter z=2.075, p=.0380 and for ExMoney z=2.613, p=.0090. Subjects have more letters in stock in the 
treatment they played first, regardless of the treatment. Consequently, since aggregated values are analyzed, the 
further analysis is not affected. 
100 
thus yielding the interpretation that a substantial crowding-out of private investment occurs. 
In ExMoney, this is obvious as there are no differences in the investment behavior by 
introducing a subsidy. For ExLetter, consider that each subject receives letters worth 44 
tokens but only invests 70.83 tokens. Compared to the 60.78 tokens in control, less than a 
quarter of the subsidy is reinvested in additional letters. Respectively, the value of unused 
resources – i.e. the letters stock – increases, albeit insignificantly in subsidy in both 
experiments (WSR-test for ExLetter z=-0.109, p=.9133; for ExMoney z=-0.885, p=.3760), 
meaning that only slightly more resources are left unused in subsidy in both experiments. 
Unsurprisingly, subjects overall generate more income in subsidy in both experiments 
(WSR-test for ExLetter z=-3.593, p=.0003; for ExMoney z=-3.823, p=.0001). However, 
considering the subsidy of 44 tokens – which almost doubles the starting endowment of 
50 tokens – and subtracting the subsidy from the revenues, subjects earn less in subsidy in 
ExMoney (WSR-test z=1.912, p=.0559), while the difference marginally fails to be significant 
in ExLetter (WSR-test z=1.350, p=.1769). 
This result shows that the effectiveness of subsidies in this sequential innovation setting is 
limited. The tendency to invest increases in ExLetter once a subsidy is provided, although the 
additional investments do not account for the full amount of the subsidy. For ExMoney, there 
is no difference in the investment behavior. Thus, subsidies do not add proportionally to the 
investments but rather lead to a crowding-out of private investment. Therefore, at an 
aggregate level, the overall revenue is higher when no subsidy is provided, although earnings 
increase at an individual level. This raises the question of whether the additional resources 
spent by the state through the subsidies are used in an effective way to incentivize individuals 
conducting more valuable innovations. Accordingly, this question will be investigated in the 
next section by analyzing the aggregate welfare created through innovations. 
 
RESULT 2: H2a can partly be rejected as private investment does not increase in ExMoney. 
Furthermore, introducing a subsidy leads to a crowding-out of private investment, meaning 
that H2b can be rejected. H2c can only partly be rejected since introducing a subsidy 
increases the revenue at an individual level yet reduces the revenue at the aggregate level. 
4.5.3. Welfare and innovation 
4.5.3.1. Innovative activity 
In this section, the innovative activity is examined and different measures are developed to 
analyze the welfare effects (H3). Recall that as letters have to be bought at the price of 4 
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letters with an average letter value of 1.87, only the repeated use of letters generates welfare. 
Therefore, the ratio of extensions to roots is an important indicator for the innovative activity 
of groups. This ratio is shown in table 4.3, which also displays the average word length and 
the average word value. 
Table 4.3. Overview of words created by treatment 
  ExLetter ExMoney 
  control subsidy control subsidy 







































In general, the sum of the number of roots and extensions can be interpreted as a measure 
for the innovative activity, as they show how many innovations have been created overall. 
The table shows that the number of roots is higher in subsidy in both experiments (WSR-test 
for ExLetter z=-2.665, p=.0077; for ExMoney z=-2.110, p=.0349), i.e. the tendency to create 
basic innovations is higher when a subsidy is provided. Since extensions are more 
sophisticated innovations than roots, they are more desirable from a welfare perspective. 
Comparing the number of extensions, there are no differences between control and subsidy in 
ExLetter (WSR-test z=0.240, p=.8103) and only weak differences in ExMoney (WSR-test 
z=1.735, p=.0827). However, the number of extensions per root is higher in control (WSR-
test for ExLetter z=1.938, p=.0526; for ExMoney z=2.093, p=.0364) in both experiments, 
which results from the higher total number of roots created in subsidy in both experiments. 
All other indicators show no differences between treatments and experiments.39 
This yields the interpretation that although subjects have a higher endowment in subsidy, 
the innovative activity does not increase. By contrast, as subjects tend to create more roots in 
                                                 
39 Again, the results are not influenced by the sequence in which the treatments were conducted. This is tested 
using the procedure described in chapter 5.1: MWU-test for word length in ExLetter z=-0.751, p=.4529, in 
ExMoney z=-0.245, p=.8065; MWU-test for word value in ExLetter z=-1.457, p=.1451, in ExMoney z=1.225, 
p=.2207; MWU-test for number of roots in ExLetter z=0.310, p=.7563, in ExMoney z=0.659, p=.5101; MWU-
test for number of extensions in ExLetter z=0.177, p=.8595, in ExMoney z=0.983, p=.3257; MWU-test for 
extensions per root in ExLetter z=-0.309, p=.7573, in ExMoney z=0.572, p=.5676.  
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subsidy, they seem to use the additional resources for additional basic innovations rather than 
more sophisticated sequential innovations. This shift towards more basic innovations is not 
desirable from a welfare perspective. 
RESULT 3: There are no differences in the innovative activity between treatments, meaning 
that H3a can be rejected. Introducing a subsidy leads to a shift from more sophisticated to 
basic innovations. 
4.5.3.2. Measures of welfare 
In order to test for differences in welfare (H3b), three measures can be derived to gain a better 
understanding of the welfare within groups: first, the total gross value can be estimated, which 
comprises the value of all created innovations, i.e. the sum of all word values; second, the 
total net value additionally considers the investment, which includes the costs for the letters 
received for free (44 letters costing 4 tokens each) in ExLetter; and third, the relative net value 
(RNV) is used, as in Brüggemann et al. (2015). It includes the path dependency of the game 
from a myopic perspective, whereby creating a new word opens and closes different future 
innovation paths during the game. The RNV captures this dynamic element by giving a 
relative measure between the most and the less valuable innovation decision that each subject 
could have made in each specific situation of the game. Therefore, Cit is defined as the actual 
choice set for each subject i in period t defined by the letters owned by player i and the roots 
and extensions produced by all players at time t. The net payoff in each period π(cit) is 
subsequently calculated for each choice citϵCit by deducting the investment in letters used and 
the license fees from the value of the new root or extension. The actual payoff πit is then 
computed by using the maximum Mit=max{π(cit),citϵCit} and minimum mit={π(cit),citϵCit} 
payoffs achievable from Cit. Hence, the relative net value RNVit is computed as: 
RNVit=(πit-mit)/(Mit-mit) 
Note that RNVit ϵ[0,1], M≥0 and m≤c≤ M. Subjects should aim to maximize the RNV as it 
increases their payoffs. It is also a measure for subjects’ performance conditional upon the 
opportunities that they have based upon the words already created in the game and the letters 
owned by each subject in any given situation.40 The findings for the three measures are 
summarized in table 4.4. 
  
                                                 
40 Note that the RNV is a measure for optimality from a myopic perspective and that the decision might not be 
optimal for the whole group. To measure the optimum for the whole group, all possible future innovation paths 
would have to be calculated for each word. This is obviously unrealistic for subjects given their cognitive 
abilities and thus it is not considered as a measure for the optimal choice. For an elaboration of this issue, see 
also Brüggemann et al. (2015). 
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Table 4.4. Different welfare measures by treatment and group 
  ExLetter ExMoney 
  control subsidy control subsidy 







 median 297.5 297 302 282 
 min 197 200 186 192 
 max 487 568 408 410 







 median 44.5 26.5 65 32 
 min 1 -78 -54 -53 
 max 195 280 127 124 
relative net value 









 median 0.470 0.489 0.473 0.417 
 min 0.316 0.338 0.338 0.327 
 max 0.589 0.566 0.566 0.569 
 
Regarding the total gross value, there are no differences across treatments (WSR-test for 
ExLetter z=-0.283, p=.7771; for ExMoney z=0.543, p=.5869).41 Figure 4.3 shows the total net 
value in detail, which corrects for the costs of the letters, including both the individually-
bought letters and those received for free. 
 
  
                                                 
41 There are no differences due to the sequence order of the treatments, which is tested following the same 
procedure as described in chapter 5.1: MWU-test for the total gross value in ExLetter z=0.000, p=1.000, in 
ExMoney z=1.266, p=.2055; MWU-test for the total net value in ExLetter z=-1.060, p=.2891, in ExMoney 
z=-0.653, p=.5136; MWU-test for the RNV in ExLetter z=1.192, p=.2332, in ExMoney z=0.898, p=.3691. 
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Figure 4.3. Total net value ordered by within-group difference for each treatment and experiment 
a) ExLetter b) ExMoney 
 
Note: The total net value is ordered by the differences of the groups between control and subsidy within each treatment and 
experiment. The distance between control and subsidy indicates the differences in performance within the same group in the 
two treatments. Black lines indicate that a group performed better in subsidy, while gray lines show that a group performed 
better in control. 
 
In figure 4.3, it can be seen that groups react differently to the subsidy within each 
experiment: most groups (11 out of 18; 14 out of 19) perform better in control in both 
experiments (gray lines), in some groups the total net value does not differ and only few 
groups perform better in subsidy (7 out of 18; 5 out of 19). In sum, the total net value is 
significantly lower in subsidy in ExMoney (WSR-test z=2.093, p=.0364), while in ExLetter 
the difference fails to be significant (WSR-test z=1.372, p=.1701). Nevertheless, in ExLetter 
in subsidy around 33% and in ExMoney around 28% of the groups yield a negative total net 
value, which means that they were unable to create innovations amounting to the sum of their 
investments. This also occurs in around 22% of the groups in control in ExMoney but in none 
of the groups in control in ExLetter. 
These findings remain robust when path dependency is included by using the RNV, which 
integrates a myopic perspective. As a relative measure it can decrease during the game, in 
contrast to total gross value and the total net value. This might be true if subjects are unable to 
choose the best opportunity to innovate from the existing words and letters in the respective 
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Figure 4.4. Average RNV over periods by treatment 
a) ExLetter b) ExMoney 
  
Regarding the RNV, there are no substantial differences across treatments during the 
course of the game in ExLetter (WSR-test z=0.544, p=.5862). In ExMoney, subjects perform 
better in control (WSR-test z=1.771, p=.0766). In all treatments, the RNV increases at the 
beginning of the game. Subsequently, due to the increasing number of potential extensions, 
subjects become less successful in choosing the most profitable options, which leads to a 
slight decrease in the average RNV. 
In sum, subsidies do not have a positive effect when considering three welfare measures. In 
fact, in ExMoney, when considering the total net value and the RNV, subjects perform worse 
when introducing a subsidy. In ExLetter in subsidy, one-third of the groups fail to generate 
positive welfare gains altogether. These findings of the different welfare measures can be 
understood from an individual perspective, given that subjects might try to perform best 
regardless of external incentives or even – in case of pure monetary incentives – reduce their 
effort to innovate. However, from a welfare perspective, subsidies lead to higher costs, as 
shown by the lower total net value in subsidy and the lack of additional gains in 
innovativeness, as indicated by the RNV. Furthermore, the costs for the state through 
implementing subsidies are not captured with these measures, which might further diminish 
the welfare effects of allocating subsidies. 
 
RESULT 4: H3b can be rejected as subsidies fail to increase both the individual 








































In this study, laboratory evidence is presented concerning the effects of subsidies in 
stimulating private innovative activity. An experimental approach introduced by Crosetto 
(2010) is used and modified, which implements the features of risky investment, creativity 
and ownership in a laboratory experiment that simulates a cumulative innovation process. 
Therefore, this experimental design allows adding counterfactual evidence to the existing 
literature on the effects of public subsidies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). Two specific 
situations in the continuum from restrictive grant-in-aid to freely-usable monetary subsidies 
are applied, namely through additional material resources and a direct monetary subsidy. 
The main findings of this study are that subsidies neither increase private innovative 
activities nor overall welfare. Furthermore, the investment behavior changes with a subsidy 
and a substantial crowding-out of private investment occurs. While subjects individually 
increase their incomes due to the higher endowments with subsidies, their innovation output 
remains unchanged in both experiments. Moreover, the kind of innovations produced changes 
due to the subsidy, whereby more basic innovations are created, which are less desirable from 
a welfare perspective than more sophisticated innovations. In turn, the cooperation behavior – 
as measured by the level of license fees chosen – does not change due to subsidies. 
When taking into account different welfare measures, none of them show a positive effect 
of subsidies on the overall welfare. Following the individual results, subjects’ behavior is 
influenced by the kind of subsidy: when including the costs of a subsidy incurred by the state, 
the overall welfare decreases in the experiment with a direct monetary subsidy and remains 
stable in the experiment with additional material resources. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that subsidies distributed in the form of additional material resources fail to increase welfare, 
while direct monetary subsidies even have a negative impact. Overall, these results support 
previous studies arguing that subsidies have little or even negative effects on the innovative 
activity by failing to increase innovativeness or producing a crowding-out of private 
investment. Accordingly, due to the additional costs to the state and the doubtful benefits, 
public subsidies as a policy instrument to foster private innovation might need to be called 
into question. 
While this study has been able to yield novel empirical evidence, it also has several 
limitations, which should be taken into account in future studies. For instance, only two 
particular kinds and amounts of subsidies are tested, whereby further studies might test 
different specifics of innovation subsidies in a laboratory environment. Moreover, the 
additional costs that the state would have to bear for implementing and distributing the 
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subsidies cannot be considered in this setting; accordingly, further studies might include the 
approximate costs of introducing and distributing subsidies and thus provide an estimation 
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Instructions for all treatments 
 
Note: In general, the control treatment is described, which is the same in both experiments. 
The differences between treatments are indicated in square brackets, whereby the subsidy 
treatment of ExLetter is denominated as ‘extra letter’ and the subsidy treatment of ExMoney 
as ‘extra money’. Furthermore, the order (first, second) in which the treatments were 
conducted is indicated. The original instructions were in German and are available from the 





In this game, your task is to build words using letters as in the board game “Scrabble”. By 
building words, you increase your payoff: for each word, you receive a payoff calculated by 
the sum of the values of each letter. You start the game with an endowment of 4 letters. 
During the course of the game, you are able to buy additional letters. 
[extra letter, first: At the end of your turn, you will additionally receive one letter for free.] 
[extra money, first: At the end of your turn, you will receive 4 tokens, i.e. the value of one 
letter, for free.] 
You will play in a group of 4 players. 
 
The Payoff 
Your payoff depends on the sum of the value of your letters, which is calculated in 
experimental tokens. One token is converted to €0.10 at the end of the experiment. You start 
this part of the game with an endowment of 50 tokens. Note that it is possible to finish the 
experiment with less than your starting endowment. 
 
Please note the table below, which contains all letters, their value (in tokens) and the 
frequency with which they occur in the game.  
 
Table A4.1. List of letters 
 
Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency Letter Value Frequency 
A 1 10 J 6 2 S 1 14 
B 3 4 K 4 4 T 1 12 
C 4 4 L 2 6 U 1 12 
D 1 8 M 3 8 V 6 2 
E 1 30 N 1 18 W 3 2 
F 4 4 O 2 6 X 8 2 
G 2 6 P 4 2 Y 10 2 
H 2 8 Q 10 2 Z 3 2 
I 1 12 R 1 12    
 
On the next page, you will find a screenshot of the main board of the game and some 









































































































































































































































































































































































Course of a Turn 
 
When it is your turn, a dialog pops up asking you for choices. You have 60 seconds for your 
decisions. You can see the remaining time at the top-left corner of the screen. If your time 
expires, you are subtracted 1 token from your endowment for every additional 10 seconds. 
Every turn comprises five phases: 
 
1. Word phase I 
 
Your activity: Producing or extending words 
You can use German words, their conjugations and declinations and some names of places 
and persons. You can test if a word is correct using the spellchecker when it is not your 
turn. Each letter can only be used once: after producing or extending a word, the letter will 
be deleted from your list. 
Correct words can be built as follows: 
 
Option 1:               Producing a 3-letter word 
 
a) You can produce a word using exactly three of your letters by typing the letters on 
your keyboard. 
The payoff that you earn for creating a word is given by the sum of the value of the 
letters (Example: ‘pol’: p = 4, o = 2, l = 2. This results in 4+2+2 = 8 tokens). 
 
Option 2:                Extending a word 
 
b) You can extend an existing word by inserting one letter in any position in the 
word. For example, ‘ast’ can be extended into ‘last’, ‘rast’ and ‘aste’, and ‘last’ 
again into ‘laust’ and this into ‘klaust’. It is not possible to rearrange existing 
words (e.g. to build from ‘ast’ the word ‘star’). 
Your payoff results from the sum of the value of the letters of the newly-extended 
word. By extending e.g. ‘last’ into ‘laust’, you get l = 2, a = 1, u = 1, s = 1, t = 1, so 
2+1+1+1+1 = 6 tokens. Every word can only be produced once but can 
subsequently be used for as many extensions as possible. 
 
Option 3:                Passing 
 





2. Royalty phase I 
 
Your activity: Setting a royalty fee 
After producing a word, you have to decide whether or not to set a royalty fee that other 
players are required to pay when creating extensions. If you set a royalty fee, you will have to 
choose between 10 and 100 percent of the value of the word. 
 
Figure A4.1. Intellectual property choice 
 
 
If another player extends your word, the fee is automatically transferred to you. 
 
In the following, you can find three examples for others extending your word: 
 
- If you choose no license fee, the word is entirely free to use for the other players. They 
will receive the entire value of the word. 
- At 100 percent, you will receive the initial value of the word and the next player only 
receives the value of his added letter. 
- The choice of 20 percent means that the respective player has to pay 20 percent of the 
value of the word to you. The other player will receive 80 percent plus the value of 
their added letter. 
 
The word and the royalty fee remain fixed during the entire game. Both appear on the list of 
public words on the main board and can be used by all other players. However, other players 
are required to pay the respective royalty fee when extending the word. 
Furthermore, you will have to decide whether to set a royalty fee if you extend a word with a 
single letter. In this case, you only decide on the fee for your added letter. 
 
3. Word phase II 
 
After the first license phase, a second word phase ensues, in which you can produce another 
word following the procedure described above. 
 
4. Royalty phase II 
 
If you have produced or extended a second word, you will have to decide once again whether 





5. Buying phase 
 
Your activity: Buying letters 
You can choose to buy no, one or two letters at the price of 4 tokens for each letter. The order 
of the letters has been randomly determined prior to the game by sampling without 
replacement from the list of letters shown on the table A4.1. At the beginning, you are 
provided four letters and 50 tokens  
[extra letter, first: and in each turn one additional letter in the buying phase] 
[extra money, first: and in each turn four additional tokens in the buying phase] 
for free. 
 
After that, your turn ends and it is the next player’s turn. The game is played for 12 periods. 
Finally, some examples for the calculation of your payoff are provided: 
 
Example 1: If player 1 sets a royalty fee of 90 percent for the word ‘ast’ (value of the word 3 
tokens: a = 1, s = 1, t = 1) and player 2 extends the word into ‘hast’ (value of h = 2), this 
results in the following payoffs: 
Player 1: 90 percent of 3 tokens = 2.7 tokens (royalty fee for player 1) 
Player 2: 3 – 2.7 tokens (to player 1) + 2 tokens for the letter ‘h’ = 0.3 tokens + 2 tokens = 
2.3 tokens 
 
Example 2: If player 1 sets the royalty fee of 0 percent for ‘ast’, player 2 receives the sum of 
the value of all letters for extending it into ‘hast’: 
Player 1: 0 percent of 3 tokens = 0 token 
Player 2: 100 percent of 5 tokens = 5 tokens 
 
Example 3: After extending a word, the player has to set a royalty fee for the added letter. 
Player 1 sets a royalty fee of 10 percent for ‘ast’ and player 2 sets a royalty fee of 50 percent 
for the letter ‘h’ in ‘hast’. If player 3 then extends ‘hast’ into ‘haust’, this results in the 
following payoffs:  
Player 1: 10 percent of 3 tokens = 0.3 (royalty fee for player 1) 
Player 2: 50 percent of 2 tokens = 1 (royalty fee for player 2)  
Player 3: 6 tokens for ‘haust’ – 0.3 tokens (to player 1) – 1 token (to player 2) = 4.7 tokens 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Once the participants of a session had finished the first part, they were handed out the second 
part of the instructions: 
 
Hereafter, you will play the game again with the following changes: 
- You receive again 50 tokens. Your payoffs will be aggregated at the end of the 
experiment. 
- The groups are matched randomly. 
- [control, first; extra letter, second: In the buying phase at the end of your turn, you 
receive a free letter in each turn and you can only buy one additional letter.] 
[control, first; extra money, second: At the end of each turn, 4 tokens are added to 
your endowment, which amounts to the cost of one letter.] 
[extra letter, first; control, second: In the buying phase at the end of your turn, you no 
longer receive a free letter anymore; instead, you are now able to buy two, one or no 
letters.] 
[extra money, first; control, second: In the buying phase at the end of your turn, it is 
no longer the case that 4 extra tokens are added to your endowment.] 
 
Apart from these changes, all parameters of the game remain constant.  
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Appendix B 
Instructions for the control task 
 
Note: The instructions for the word task were shown to participants on the screen. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
In the next screen, you will see a string comprising 9 letters. 
You will be asked to create as many German words as possible using these letters within 3 
minutes. 
You can type the words you create in the field beneath the string of 9 letters and submit them 
by pressing Enter. 
You can use each letter only once per word and a word cannot be shorter than 3 letters. 
Longer words generate more points. 
3-letter word: 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 points 
4-letter word: 4+ 3 + 2 + 1 = 10 points 
etc. 
After 3 minutes have expired, the test will end and you will be shown your results. 
As soon as you enter the next screen, the timer will start ticking. 




Performance in the control task 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
To test for individual task-specific knowledge, a control task is run prior to the experiment. 
Therefore, the word task by Eckartz et al. (2012) is implemented, in which subjects are asked 
to build as many words as possible out of the letterset accehhikllst within three minutes. The 
instructions for the control task are provided in appendix B. For every word that they create, 
subjects earn points, whereby the number of points increases disproportionally with the word 
length: a word with three letters generates 6 points, a four-letter word 10 points, a five-letter 
word 15 points, etc. Overall, given the letterset, 330 different words can be generated, which 
are worth 5,585 points. In each session, the five subjects scoring the most points were 
awarded an additional 1€ to their overall payoff. The distribution of the groups’ performance 
across treatments – as measured by the points achieved – is provided in figure A4.2. 
 
Figure A4.2. Performance in the control task by group and treatment 
 
At the group level, there is some heterogeneity in the task-specific skills, yet no substantial 
differences when compared across experiments (MWU-test for extra letter vs. extra money 
z=-1.216 and p=.2242). Accordingly, it can be assumed that these results are not driven by 
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Innovation research has developed a broad set of methodological approaches in recent 
decades. In this paper, we propose laboratory experiments as a fruitful methodological 
addition to the existing methods in innovation research. We provide an overview of the 
existing methods, discuss the advantages and limitations of laboratory experiments and 
review examples of experimental studies dealing with different fields of innovation policy, 
namely intellectual property rights, financial instruments, payment schemes and R&D 
competition. Following recent methodological contributions, we propose a pragmatic use of 
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Fostering research and innovativeness to support economic growth and increase 
competitiveness has become a central paradigm for policy makers worldwide in recent 
decades. The European Commission has recently reaffirmed this goal by committing to spend 
up to three percent of the European Union’s GDP to support private innovation activity until 
2020. By means of this and other policy instruments, the EU thus aims to become an 
“innovation union” (COM(2014) 339). This paradigmatic focus has been adopted by the 
scientific community, which similarly discusses the topics of innovation and industrial policy 
broadly, trying to obtain insights and provide advice to policy makers concerning the design 
of policy instruments that optimally foster innovation activity (Mazzucato et al. 2015). 
Economic innovation research traditionally argues for government intervention in the case 
of market failure, which is characterized by the imperfect allocation of resources; for 
example, due to public goods, imperfect competition, negative externalities, information and 
coordination failures (Bator 1958). Given the political commitment to foster innovation 
activity, government interventions can provide remedies to market failures. For this purpose, 
several distinct methods of supporting private economic subjects in their innovation activities 
have been developed. Firstly, regulatory instruments such as rules, norms and standards have 
been introduced, such as patents and copyright law. These regulations are compulsory for all 
economic actors and thus shape the overall market conditions for innovative products and 
processes. Secondly, financial instruments have been introduced to promote innovative 
activity, with examples including subsidies, cash grants and reduced interest-loans, as well as 
disincentives like tariffs, taxes and charges. Thirdly, there are ‘soft’ instruments that include 
normative incentives such as moral appeals to economic actors and voluntary commitments 
like technical standards or public-private partnerships (Vedung 1998; Borrás and Edquist 
2013). 
To analyze and evaluate the effects and optimal design of these instruments, economic 
innovation research has established a large number of empirical research methods. Along with 
the overall expansion and professionalization of experimental economics, behavioral evidence 
collected in laboratory experiments have become a vital complement to economic innovation 
research in recent years. Following Sørensen et al. (2010) and Chetty (2015), we suggest that 
lab experiments constitute a promising addition to the methodological toolkit in innovation 
research, thus advancing novel insights and providing predictions and policy implications by 
incorporating behavioral factors. We thus argue that laboratory experiments should be used if 
they yield additional evidence unattainable by other methods in a particular field of study. 
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This resonates with the arguments by Falk and Heckman (2009), Chetty (2015), Madrian 
(2014) and Weimann (2015), who propose a pragmatic approach concerning the use of 
evidence derived from experimental methods, arguing that all empirical methods should be 
viewed as complementary (Falk and Heckman 2009). In this paper, we aim to contribute to 
the growing field of experimental innovation research, firstly by outlining the advantages and 
limitations of different methodological approaches in innovation research and more 
specifically laboratory experiments. Secondly, we provide a literature review of the existing 
experimental approaches to the field of innovation policy with examples from four sub-fields 
in which lab experiments have been conducted. We conclude by emphasizing the further use 
of laboratory experiments to innovation research. 
This paper is structured as follows: in chapter two, we outline the range of methods in 
economic innovation research, before discussing the scopes of the experimental method in 
detail in chapter three. Subsequently, we present a selection of laboratory experiments in the 
field of innovation policy, namely intellectual property rights, financial instruments, payment 
schemes and R&D competition. A conclusion is finally provided in chapter four. 
5.2. Methodological approaches in innovation research 
A large number of research methods have been developed to analyze which policy 
instruments might best foster innovative activity. Weimann (2015, 247–48) categorizes the 
different methods of generating insight by their features regarding their ability to identify 
causal relations, their generalizability to other contexts (external validity) as well as their 
broad applicability; particularly, the trade-off between causality and external validity is 
emphasized. Thus, Weimann distinguishes between (1) neoclassical models pointing out 
causal relationships, (2) ‘traditional’ empirical research primarily showing correlations, (3) 
natural experiments attempting to substantiate causal relationships, (4) randomized field 
experiments that optimally offset the trade-off between causality and external validity and (5) 
laboratory experiments providing a strong causality, yet lacking external validity. Figure 5.1 




Figure 5.1. Methodological approaches and their features 
 
 
Note: The figure is based on the classification by Weimann (2015). 
 
(1) Neoclassical models such as game theoretical or general equilibrium models have the 
advantages of enabling deriving causal relations and being easily applicable, yet they often 
lack external validity.  
Empirical investigations in innovation economics most commonly use the methods of (2) 
‘traditional’ empirical economic research, for instance official patent statistics or micro firm-
level data from surveys. For this, OLS estimations are considered appropriate to analyze and 
quantify observable variables of innovation processes; however, for dynamic effects, these 
methods often lead to problems of causality, endogeneity and selectivity. A further 
shortcoming of using this form of data is that innovation surveys necessarily rely on the 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to voluntarily disclose information about their firm, which 
potentially biases the data. Furthermore, the extent to which government funding is actually 
used for research by the firms often remains unclear and the public funding decisions often 
lead to a selectivity bias, thus making public funding an endogenous variable, which 
establishes further dependencies between the respective variables (Busom 2000). Moreover, 
patents and patent pools are often used as an approximation for the innovation activity to 
estimate the firms’ innovation output. This prompts a number of issues; for example, because 
small and medium enterprises use other forms of protecting their innovations and patent less 
than large firms, due to potentially expensive patent litigations and patent theft (Thomä and 
Bizer 2013). Nevertheless, this methodological approach to innovation research has strongly 
improved its data availability, methods and research designs in the past 25 years, 
implementing methods such as difference-in-difference estimators, sample selection models, 
instrumental variables and non-parametric matching methods (Angrist and Pischke 2010; 
124 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). Overall, this approach entails a high level of external validity and 
applicability, but often only a low level of causality. 
Another empirical means of evaluating policy instruments is (3) natural experiments, 
which feature a high level of external validity. Furthermore, due to improved methodological 
approaches, causal relations have substantiated in recent years. However, the applicability is 
often low, since it is difficult to find appropriate control groups that could enable a clear 
comparison (Weimann 2015). 
It has been argued that the issues involved with using the ‘traditional’ methods of empirical 
economic can best be solved by conducting (4) randomized field experiments in which real-
life incidents are treated similar to experiments. They are considered the “gold standard” for 
evaluating new policy instruments as they enable identifying causality rather than mere 
correlations (Falck et al. 2013; Boockmann et al. 2014). As an example, Chatterji et al. (2013) 
suggest that the distribution of building sites in new industrial areas could be randomized, 
which would lead to better results in subsequent impact analyses of cluster policies. While 
optimally combining external validity and causality, randomized field experiments suffer 
from a lack of applicability as their adequate design is time-consuming, expensive and often 
highly impractical; consequently, other methods are regularly preferred (Angrist and Pischke 
2010). 
(5) Laboratory experiments can be considered an alternative to overly costly and 
impractical field experimentation, combining a high level of causality with a high level of 
applicability. Despite the lower level of external validity, laboratory studies can be a valuable 
substitute for randomized field experiments and provide insightful new angles to research 
topics inaccessible through ‘traditional’ empirical methods. 
Since each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, the method used for a particular 
research question should be chosen depending on the object of research, the availability of 
data and the possibility for conducting field experimentation. Overall, a mix of 
complementary empirical methods might thus be the most promising approach (Weimann 
2015). In the following, we focus on laboratory experiments, which are the most recent 
addition to the methodological toolbox of innovation research, including discussing their 
limitations and advantages. 
5.3. Limitations and advantages of experimental methods 
Although lab experiments can be transferred and used to derive relevant policy implications, 
there are systematic limitations to this approach. Critics of lab experiments such as Levitt and 
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List (2007; 2008) emphasize the restrictions, while Falk and Heckman (2009) provide 
refutations:  
Observation: Participants are observed and act in an artificial environment, which might 
influence their behavior due to expectancy effects and the experimenter demand bias. 
Barmettler et al. (2012) contradict this argument and show experimentally that complete 
anonymity between the experimenter and participants does not change the latter’s behavior. 
Furthermore, it is argued that close social observation is not limited to the lab but rather is a 
feature common to all economic interactions. 
 
Stakes: It can be argued that the stakes in experiments are too low to induce realistic behavior 
in participants. Experiments with varying stake sizes yield mixed results depending on the 
experimental situation (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). However, Falk and Heckman (2009) ask 
how often people take choices involving sums equal to their monthly incomes and how 
representative such high-stake experiments would actually be. Consequently, they suggest 
that the average level of stakes in laboratory experiments correspond to the most common 
choices that individuals take. 
 
Sample size: The sample sizes of lab experiments are criticized as being too small, although 
this is refuted such that sample sizes are stated to adequately correspond to this method and 
thus yield valid assertions. 
 
Participants: Student participant pools are considered unrepresentative of the overall 
population. While this might not be a problem when testing theories, in the case of innovation 
experiments, other populations such as researchers or entrepreneurs might be more 
appropriate experimental participants, depending on the research question. 
 
Self-selection: There is a self-selection bias since students with particular traits sign up for 
participant pools. Nevertheless, student pools ensure that the selection can be controlled and 
provide information on participants’ demographics, personal backgrounds and preferences. 
Thus, the disadvantages connected to selection biases – which are potentially prevalent in 
field experiments as well as other empirical research methods – can be somewhat controlled. 
 
Learning: Participants often cannot learn in experiments and adjust their behavior 
accordingly, yet this is also a prevalent factor in many economic interactions outside of the 
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lab, as real-world interactions can often be considered as one-shot games with no chance of 
learning in repeated decisions. Furthermore, a large number of repeated games have been 
considered in experimental settings to determine learning effects, for example Cooper et al. 
(1999) with regard to incentive systems. 
 
External validity: Lab experiments are considered as lacking external validity, meaning that 
they produce unrealistic data without further relevance for understanding the “real world”: a 
criticism that holds true both for lab experiments and theoretic models (Weimann 2015, 240–
41). The challenge in designing experiments is to establish the best way of isolating the causal 
effect of interest and thus providing insights about universally prevalent effects that transfer to 
other economic situations outside of the lab. In a recent study, Herbst and Mas (2015) show 
how well-designed experiments can ensure that individual behavior outside the lab is captured 
adequately, thereby gaining a higher external validity than traditionally assumed for 
laboratory studies. Further studies comparing laboratory and field evidence will have to show 
whether this might change the general perception of the external validity of lab experiments 
(Charness and Fehr 2015). However, in some research contexts, it might not be possible to 
substantially increase the external validity. In such cases, lab experiments can serve as a 
starting point to isolate clear effects of specific innovation instruments. Subsequently, these 
effects have to be investigated with other methods involving a higher external validity, e.g. 
field experiments in a firm. These methods then have to show whether the initial results from 
the laboratory hold in contexts outside the lab. 
 
Generalizability: The lack of generalizability of behavioral patterns resulting from lab 
experiments that refrain from testing a theoretical model is criticized. While the arguments 
mentioned above reduce this problem, it remains a considerable drawback to some 
experimental evidence. Nevertheless, every empirical method faces this issue due to the 
unavoidable dependency of data on a specific context. 
 
Overall, lab experiments entail several distinct advantages as they provide researchers with 
the means of deriving causal relations from controlled manipulations of specific conditions, 
while controlling all surrounding factors. This ensures precise measurements and makes it 
possible to preclude confounding effects such as multiple incentives or repeated interactions. 
The experimenter thus retains almost complete control of the decision environment, namely 
the material payoffs, the information given to participants, the order of decisions, the duration 
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and iterations of the experiment. Participants are assigned randomly, which reduces the 
selection bias. Moreover, they are incentivized monetarily for their decisions, whereby it can 
be assumed that decisions are taken seriously: “In this sense, behavior in the laboratory is 
reliable and real: Participants in the lab are human beings who perceive their behavior as 
relevant, experience real emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences” 
(Falk and Heckman 2009, 536). The results are replicable and they allow investigating 
specific institutions at a relatively low cost. This can be particularly useful when considering 
exogenous changes like policy interventions and new regulations, where counterfactual 
situations can be created and their effects tested far more easily in lab rather than field 
experiments. With the possibility of altering only one factor – e.g. the patent regime – lab 
experiments allow analyzing the relevance of a particular factor without other factors 
confounding the observed behavior. Furthermore, lab experiments enable the researcher to 
examine different innovation types, effects of incentives and splitting up the innovation 
process to observe individual behavior at particular points of the process (Smith 1994, 2003; 
Falk and Heckman 2009). 
In the following, we review examples of different fields of innovation research where lab 
experiments have been put forth to provide novel insights. 
5.4. Literature review 
By analyzing the effects of specific policy instruments via economic experiments, several of 
the advantages of lab experiments described above can be used fruitfully. In particular, it 
becomes possible to compare counterfactual data of decision situations with and without a 
particular instrument. Therefore, it is possible to analyze subjects’ specific reactions to 
changes in the framework conditions, which is almost impossible when using “real-world” 
data. There are additional merits to the controlled lab environment, in which only one factor is 
changed; for instance, innovation behavior and its development can be observed and analyzed 
over several periods. Of course, the innovation process is necessarily stylized in lab 
experiments; nevertheless, a number of promising ideas concerning how to transfer the 
innovation process into the laboratory have been provided in recent years. Table 5.1 
comprises the experiments reviewed in the following chapters and summarizes in brief the 
particular task subjects had to solve.   
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Table 5.1. Overview on the experiments reviewed 








Producing and trading rivalrous and non-
rivalrous goods composed of colors 
Meloso et al. 2009 Real effort 
search task 




Creative task Creating and trading poems 
Crosetto 2010 Creative task Creating and extending words and deciding 
whether to use IP protection 
Brüggemann et al. 
2015 







Creative task Creating and extending words, setting license 
fees 




Eckartz et al. 2012 Real effort 
search task 
Combining as many words as possible from 12 
given letters 




Managing a virtual lemonade stand 
Erat and Gneezy 
2015 
Creative task Solving rebus puzzles 
Bradler 2015 Creative task Imagining unusual uses for items  
4.4 
R&D competition 
Isaac and Reynolds 
1988 
Investment task Taking investment choices under competition 
Isaac and Reynolds 
1992 
Investment task Taking investment choices including the game 
bingo  
Sbriglia and Hey 
1994 
Search task Finding a letter combination by buying 
different letter trails under competition 
Zizzo 2002 Investment task Competing for a prize over several periods 
Silipo 2005 Investment task Accumulating “knowledge units” under risk 
and competition 
Cantner et al. 2009 Search task Searching for product specifications of a car 
including investment and competition 
Aghion et al. 2014 Investment task Competing for finding an innovation including 




5.4.1. Intellectual property rights  
For instance, there are several experiments implementing (real effort) search tasks to simulate 
the innovation process. Buchanan and Wilson (2014) design an experimental environment 
with subjects producing, trading and consuming rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods. Rivalrous 
goods are produced out of two complements and can be sold. By contrast, producing non-
rivalrous goods is possible by participating in a search task in order to find the “favorite 
good” of the specific period, which is more valuable than the rivalrous good and – in 
opposition to rivalrous goods – can be sold several times. The authors implement one 
treatment with intellectual property, in which selling and transferring the non-rivalrous good 
is restricted to the respective owner, as well as one treatment without intellectual property, 
where non-rivalrous goods can be created several times. The authors find no differences in the 
value of produced non-rivalrous goods and the average money earned regardless of 
intellectual property protection. Overall, Buchanan and Wilson suggest that intellectual 
property protection does not spur innovativeness. However, the protection only serves as an 
additional incentive, whereas the existence of entrepreneurial individuals is more important. 
The respective entrepreneurs subsequently profit substantially from the protection, as well as 
generating wealth without intellectual property protection. 
Meloso et al. (2009) use another kind of search task – namely the knapsack problem – to 
simulate intellectual discovery in a patent and a non-patent market system, in which 
components of potential discoveries are traded. The goal of the knapsack problem is to 
combine inputs of a particular value and realize an optimal weighing of the components. In 
sum, the number of subjects who were able to find the correct solution to the knapsack task 
was higher in the markets system, which has the advantages that no scope of intellectual 
property rights has to be defined beforehand and that it entails no monopoly rights. Therefore, 
the authors state that markets do not necessarily fail – as theoretical contributions suggest – 
for non-excludable and non-rival goods. 
Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010) let subjects write poems and implement a market for the 
poems. Depending on the initial distribution of intellectual property rights, they find different 
preferences of the innovators, owners and buyers. There is a robust endowment effect that 
manifests itself in the high offers of innovators and a significantly lower willingness to pay 
among the buyers. This experiment has the advantage of simulating the innovation activity 
most closely on an individual level, yet it is not possible to further evaluate the particular 
poems and determine a ranking for the quality of the innovations. 
130 
Including further features of the innovation process – namely creativity, ownership and 
investment choices – Crosetto (2010) developed a task to simulate innovative activity based 
upon the board game Scrabble. He uses his setting to analyze the individual behavior when 
subjects have to create and extend words and are able to select between the intellectual 
property schemes of open source and fixed license fees. He finds that subjects’ propensity to 
provide their innovations open source is more likely when the level of license fees is high. 
Brüggemann et al. (2015) extend this experimental setting to test for the effect of different 
regulatory incentive schemes on the individual innovativeness. They compare a treatment 
with the possibility to choose the amount of license fees to a system without license fees and 
further implement the ability to communicate. They find that communication does not change 
the innovative behavior and that welfare is higher in the no-license-fee system than in the 
license-fee system. However, when given the possibility to license innovations, subjects 
display a high demand for being rewarded monetarily rather than providing innovations to 
other participants free of charge. 
5.4.2. Financial instruments 
There is broad literature about the difficulties in analyzing the effect of subsidies and other 
public programs to foster innovativeness due to endogeneity and selection bias problems. 
Although the methods used have advanced substantially in past years, lab experiments can 
contribute to this sub-field of innovation research (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). In some 
cases, experiments might be the only way to provide insights about new – and potentially 
costly – policy instruments before they are implemented in the “real world”. This approach 
might thus be a particularly promising methodological choice when new institutional 
framework conditions are tested, which aim at fostering the innovative activity. Nevertheless, 
there is only a limited number of studies dealing with financial instruments to date. 
Using the Scrabble-based word creation task introduced by Crosetto (2010), Brüggemann 
and Meub (2015) analyze the individual behavior in two types of innovation contests by 
awarding subjects with a bonus for the best innovation in one treatment and for the largest 
innovation effort in another, comparing individual performance to a benchmark treatment 
without a prize. They find that the willingness to cooperate decreases when innovation 
contests are introduced, while the overall welfare remains constant across treatments. 
Furthermore, using the same word task, Brüggemann (2015) analyzes the effects of two 
distinct forms of subsidies on innovativeness; first, by supplying resources determined for 
innovative activities; and second, by providing additional financial resources not restricted to 
the use in innovative activities. She finds that both forms of subsidy lead to a crowding-out of 
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private investment and negative welfare effects when the costs for the subsidy are included. 
Furthermore, subsidies fail to induce a positive effect on the individual innovation behavior. 
5.4.3. Payment schemes 
Another class of experiments focuses on the creative element of innovation and the effects of 
different payment schemes. Eckartz et al. (2012) test the effects of different payment schemes 
on creativity using a word-based real effort task, where subjects have to combine as many 
words as possible out of twelve prescribed letters within a certain time. They examine a flat 
fee, a linear payment and a tournament and find no substantial differences between the three 
incentive schemes. Similarly analyzing different payment schemes, Ederer and Manso (2012) 
compare the innovative activity when offering a fixed wage, a wage based upon pay-for-
performance and a split wage, which is fixed at the beginning and based upon performance 
later on. In a search task, subjects have to manage a lemonade stand, whereby they have to 
decide upon several variables such as the location, content, and price to find the most 
profitable solution. The authors find that the split wage with tolerance for early failure and 
compensation for long-term success leads to more innovative effort and higher overall 
welfare. 
Erat and Gneezy (2015) compare three payment schemes, namely a pay-for-performance 
scheme, a competitive scheme and a benchmark without incentives. Unlike Ederer and Manso 
(2012), they use rebus puzzles as a creative task and find that competition reduces creativity 
and a pay-for-performance scheme does not change creativity in comparison to a situation 
without incentives. Comparing the two financial incentives, creativity is higher in a pay-for-
performance scheme. 
Bradler (2015) used the “unusual uses task” – an established creativity test – to compare 
accomplishment, self-reporting and risk behavior. In the task, subjects have to imagine as 
many uses for a particular object as possible in a certain time, choosing their preferred 
payment scheme prior to the task, i.e. a tournament or a fixed payment. She finds that the 
different payment schemes appeal to different types of subjects: risk-loving subjects with a 
high self-assessment tend to choose the tournament; however, in contrast to previous studies, 
creative subjects do not tend to choose the tournament more often than the fixed payment. 
5.4.4. R&D competition 
Finally, in the experiments on R&D competition, the authors focus on different investment 
task to analyze the individual behavior in competitive and innovative environments. 
Experiments on patent races and R&D competition were first established by Isaac and 
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Reynolds (1988) to simulate a one-stage stochastic invention model and subsequently a two-
staged model (Isaac and Reynolds 1992). This class of experiments aims to test the findings 
of models with empirical evidence, whereby – in contrast to the experiments described before 
– they do not analyze specific policy instruments. Sbriglia and Hey (1994) develop a costly 
combinatorial task representing research competition for a patentable innovation to analyze 
three behavioral problems of patent races, namely how subjects select their search procedures, 
which investment strategies they use and how information is processed. The authors identify 
different types of innovators: the “winners”, who search successfully, do not act randomly and 
invest more in comparison to the “losers”, who are unable to establish a strategic search 
procedure. Furthermore, stronger competition accelerates the rate of investment and with a 
higher number of periods, successful players more commonly adapt their searching behavior. 
Zizzo (2002) tests the multi-stage patent race model by Harris and Vickers (1987) with an 
investment task where subjects compete for a monetary prize over several periods. Their 
results disconfirm the theoretical assertions, as leaders of a patent race do not invest more 
than their followers. Furthermore, the authors find no virtual monopoly and investments do 
not change as predicted by the model. Silipo (2005) analyze the cooperation and break-up 
behavior in joint ventures in a dynamic patent race model theoretically and experimentally. In 
the model, they find that the starting positions of the competitors are crucial for being 
cooperative or not: if the innovators start at different points of the research process, the 
probability of joint ventures decreases, while in joint ventures the pace of the process slows 
down. The results of their experiment correspond to the model, aside from some races in 
which subjects perform worse than anticipated. 
Cantner et al. (2009) test a patent race model limited to a duopoly market without price 
competition by implementing a multi-dimensional search task with uncertainty. They find that 
different strategies solve the task, namely risky innovative investment and risk-free imitations. 
On average, subjects choose the risky innovative investment based upon the risk of an 
investment failure, their anticipated revenue and their relative success in the experiment. 
Furthermore, the gap in subjects’ earnings has a positive impact on their investment in the 
next periods. Finally, Aghion et al. (2014) analyze the effects of competition on a step-by-step 
innovation by means of a risky investment task with different levels of competition and time 
horizons. The results show an increase in investment for neck-and-neck firms, yet a decrease 




In this paper, we present the limitations and advantages of using laboratory experiments for 
innovation research and review 18 examples from four specific fields in which lab 
experiments already have been conducted. As the experimental method yields promising 
results in testing intellectual property rights, financial instruments, payment schemes and 
R&D competition, we suggest that laboratory experiments can serve as a useful additional 
tool to innovation economists and represent a source of promising new insights for innovation 
research. 
In particular, we argue that lab experiments should be used to target specific policy 
questions and thus provide measures for the effectiveness of specific instruments prior to their 
introduction. This approach has – in marked contrast to all other methods – the advantages of 
yielding evidence from counterfactual situations and a strong control of the setting; for 
example, when testing external incentives for innovative activity or changing parameters of 
the institutional framework. Therefore, we follow Chetty (2015) and Weimann (2015), who 
suggest a pragmatic perspective on behavioral economics, thus adding experimental evidence 
to the existing methods whenever its particular advantages outweigh its limitations. Within 
this pragmatic perspective on laboratory experiments, Chetty (2015) characterizes three ways 
in which this field of research can contribute to public policy: by presenting new policy 
instruments, developing better predictions regarding the effects of existing policies and more 
accurately measuring welfare implications. 
We hope that this overview encourages other researchers to use lab experiments in 
innovation research, which could be further developed in several domains of innovation 
research: as the existing laboratory studies on financial instruments measure effectiveness, 
future studies might focus on measuring efficiency, which would reflect promising progress in 
evaluating new means of public policy. Furthermore, lab experiments might be helpful as a 
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